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Kerr, Craig A. (Ph.D., Economics)
The Effect of Amenities on Local Wage Distributions and the Migratory Response to Racial
Wage Disparity
Thesis directed by Prof. Randall Walsh
This study predicts that local wage distributions will contract with an improvement in
amenities by imposing structure on the standard model of amenity capitalization (Roback,
1988). The added structure is Elickson’s (1971) single-crossing condition, which assumes
that the willingness to accept higher housing prices for better amenities increases with in-
come. The prediction is verified empirically by estimating the amenity-wage gradient at
separate wage quantiles. The variation in estimated gradients across wage quantile reveals
the misleading nature of the average amenity-wage gradient, which is generally estimated in
the literature. Workers at the lower end of the wage distribution are shown to earn more
in locations with better amenities while those at the higher end are shown to earn less. In
addition, both the implicit price paid for amenities and the implicit share of income spent on
amenities are shown to increase substantially with wage level. The latter provides the first
empirical evidence of an assumption that is commonly employed in urban models, namely,
that amenities are luxury goods.
In the final chapter, the idea of workers factoring in location-specific attributes to their
location choice is applied to black workers facing unexplained wage disparity. I estimate the
unexplained wage gaps between black and white workers at the MSA level in 1989 and 1999.
Consistent with Becker’s (1957) theory and the empirical results of Charles and Guryan
(2008), I find that the unexplained wage gaps are greater in MSA’s with a larger proportion
of black residents but that this relationship has weakened over time. Surprisingly, I show that
both black and white workers are less likely to leave MSA’s with greater unexplained wage
gaps and are more likely to choose MSA’s with greater gaps conditional on migrating.
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Chapter 1
The Effect of Amenities on Local Wage Distributions: Theory
1.1 Introduction
This paper imposes structure on the model of amenity capitalization presented in
Roback (1988) by employing Elickson’s (1971) single-crossing condition on worker utility.
The condition requires the willingness to pay higher housing costs in locations with better
amenities to increase with income. The main empirically testable prediction derived from
the model is that local wage distributions contract with better amenities when amenities
are luxury goods, land is a necessary good, and rents are increasing with amenities. Since
amenity-wage gradients (henceforth wage gradients) are found to differ in sign and magnitude
systematically with wage level, the average wage gradient generally estimated in the literature
will be greatly misleading for most workers.
The simultaneous capitalization of amenity value into rents and wages was first modeled
in the study of Roback (1982), which shows that rent and wage gradients are determined
by the relative value of local amenities to firms and workers. Roback (1982) notes that the
estimated wage gradient is an average of all workers in the sample, who do not have identical
incomes and may have different tastes. Thus, the model is extended to allow for two types
of workers in Roback (1988) and many types of workers with differing levels of education in
Beeson (1991). Both authors state that when tastes and productivities are allowed to differ
across workers, the signs and relative magnitudes of wage and rent gradients are ambiguous.
Therefore, more structure must be imposed on the model to derive concrete predictions.
2The model presented here incorporates a common assumption used in sorting models,
the single-crossing assumption described in Elickson (1971), to impose structure on Roback’s
(1988) model and derive predictions on how amenities are capitalized into wages differently
across workers. If preferences exhibit the single-crossing condition, then all price gradients
may be signed conditional on the amenities’ effect on productivity. In addition, in the most
plausible case where housing is a necessary good and amenities are luxury goods, the wage
gradient will be decreasing with wage whenever the rents are increasing with amenities. That
is, high-wage workers will pay more of a wage penalty to reside in a location with better
amenities than low-wage workers.
Theoretically allowing wage gradients to vary across the wage distribution is important
for at least two reasons. First, average wage gradients are misleading, especially for the
workers whose actual wage gradients are of opposite sign to the average. Obtaining results
that are able to enlighten us beyond understanding average worker behavior greatly increases
the interpretive power of the model. Second, it allows us to observe amenity valuation
separately by wage income, which may be more of interest to policy makers. For example,
the model allows for more precise predictions on changes in the tax base due to a change in
amenities, particularly when income taxes are progressive. In addition, policy makers tend
to have interests in particular income groups whose behaviors are not always well modeled
by the average worker. The result that low-income workers may actually be compensated for
living in high amenity cities calls into question the efficiency of programs such as subsidized
housing.
Many studies since Roback (1988) have incorporated multiple worker types into an
amenity capitalization model, usually choosing the types to differ on education or skill. Bee-
son (1991) illustrates how returns to schooling may theoretically decrease with amenities if
certain assumptions hold on the relative values of the education elasticities for the consump-
tion good, housing, and amenities. This result is similar to the prediction here that the wage
gradient will decreases with wage level given an assumption on relative income elasticities of
3housing and amenities. However, the theoretical prediction in this paper involves assump-
tions that are less restrictive (involving assumptions on two elasticities rather than three)
and have empirical support.
Moretti (2004) also separates workers by education and uses the percentage of workforce
that has a college degree as a productive amenity that effects all workers. An increase in
the supply of college educated workers in a metropolitan statistical area (MSA) is shown
to increase wages of all education groups. This “social return” to education is theoretically
predicted and empirically estimated to decrease as education increases. In more recent work,
Black et al (2009) show that the return to a college education, as measured by the ratio of
wages of college graduates to those of high-school graduates, is lower in cities with higher
housing price indexes, which the authors use as a measure for local amenity values.
In a model that separates worker type by skill level, Lee (2010) uses city population as
a proxy for amenities and estimates wage gradients that decrease with the skill of occupation
within the medical sector. However, he was unable to show the same pattern for workers
outside of the medical sector. In the results presented here, wage distributions are shown to
contract with amenities for multiple industry-occupation groups.
Lastly, Ng (2008) constructs a model dealing with households trading off amenities for
longer commuting times rather than lower wages within an urban area. The households in
Ng’s (2008) model differ by their preferences for amenities. Her model predicts that the type
with the stronger preference for amenities will be more willing to locate further from his job,
thus paying a higher transportation cost and earning less net wages, to live closer to the
local amenities. In the theory presented below, the reason for the difference in preferences
is given by the wage level. Workers with higher wages are more willing to accept higher
rents for more amenities and generally accept a larger wage penalty to live in a location with
better amenities.
The results presented here differ from those discussed above because they predict that
a worker’s wage gradient is decreasing as his wage level increases holding education, skill-
4level, etc. constant. Thus, if a college-educated worker who does not change occupations
receives an increase in his wage level, the results here would predict that he would implicitly
pay a greater amount for his local amenities through forgone wages than he previously did.
The results in Roback (1988), Beeson (1991), Moretti (2004), and Black et al (2009) imply
that the effect of amenities on wages remains constant for all college-educated workers while
those in Lee (2010) imply the effect remains constant across skill level (occupation).
Furthermore, although the theoretical treatment in this paper is similar to those men-
tioned above, it separates itself with the single-corssing assumption, implying that differences
in preferences are due to differences in income levels rather than education or skill-level. This
may be more reasonable as there is no direct evidence that I am aware of stating that more
educated or skilled workers have different preferences for amenities. Furthermore, the as-
sumption has not only been used to predict empirically observed sorting patterns in the
literature, but has found direct empirical support in Epple and Seig (1999).
1.2 Theoretical Model
Consider a continuum of locations, each with its own unique bundle of amenities and
supply of land. For the purpose of this study, an amenity is any location-specific attribute
that increases the utility of its residents.1 These may include publicly provided goods and
services such as parks and emergency services, local entertainment options, as well as envi-
ronmental goods such as clean air, mountains, or ocean. Denote Φj ∈ [Φ,Φ] as the continuous
amenity index that describes the overall level of amenities, which is exogenously set, in loca-
tion j. It is assumed that every worker assigns the same subjective weights to the individual
amenities. Since workers and firms do not explicitly pay for the amenities they consume, the
value of these amenities is capitalized in rents and wages.
1Local attributes that decrease resident utility are referred to as disamenities.
51.2.1 Workers
There are 2 types of workers indexed by k ∈ {A,B}. Workers differ across type with
respect to how their labor input enters the production function. The reader may think of
these types as being high-skilled and low-skilled respectively although it is not necessary for
workers to differ in skill. The important aspect of worker differences is that they enter the
production function as separate inputs that are imperfectly substitutable. Thus, their wages
are allowed to differ within a location.
Each worker selects a single location in which to reside and work. A worker of type
k residing in location j earns wage wkj and pays rent rj. The worker selects a consumption
basket of land l and a numeraire consumption good x to maximize his utility in location j
and has an indirect utility function V (rj, w
k
j ; Φj).
2
Migration is assumed to be costless and thus utility must be equated across location in
equilibrium for each type of worker. Otherwise, some workers would have incentive to move.
This condition is described by
V (rj, w
A
j ; Φj) = V
A (1.1)
for type A workers and symmetrically
V (rj, w
B
j ; Φj) = V
B (1.2)
for type B workers. Roback (1988) allows preferences to differ across worker types. Here,
I find it useful and plausible to assume that preferences are identical but that a worker’s
willingness to accept higher rents in locations with better amenities increases with his wage
similar to Elickson (1971).3
2It is assumed that the utility function of the workers is such that a positive amount of land l is always
purchased.
3A utility function that satsfies this condition is provided in Elickson (1971) as the nested CES function
U(x, l; Φ) = {[a1Φ] 1ρ + [(a2X) 1ω + (a3l) 1ω ]ωρ }ρ where the a’s, ρ, and ω are constants, ρ = σσ−1 , and σ < 1.
61.2.2 Firms
The market for the consumption good is perfectly competitive and the good’s price,
which is taken as the numeraire, is set by global markets. Firms produce the consumption
good according to a CRS production function xj = f(n
A
j , n
B
j , lj; Φj) using land and both
types of labor, nA and nB, which are assumed to be imperfect substitutes. Both types of
labor are necessary for production and amenities may effect the productivity of all inputs.
In equilibrium, the unit cost function is equal to the price of the numeraire in equilibrium
C(wAj , w
B
j , rj; Φj) = 1. (1.3)
Otherwise, firms would have incentive to enter or exit a particular market where unit cost
is not equal to unity.
To solve for the effect of amenities on local prices, Equations 1.1 to 1.3 are totally
differentiated and expressed in percentage changes.4 The system of equations is
θwAwˆ
A + θwB wˆ
B + θrrˆ + ηΦˆ = 0 (1.4)
wˆA − sAl rˆ + sAΦΦˆ = 0 (1.5)
wˆB − sBl rˆ + sBΦΦˆ = 0, (1.6)
where θp = Cpp is the cost share of factor price p,
5 hats denote percentage change zˆ = dz/z,
η = θwAηwA + θwBηwB + θrηr is the share weighted sum of the effect of amenities on the
productivity of each factor, and ηp = CpΦ(Φ/Cp) is the amenity elasticity of factor demand
4Roy’s identity is used here to convert preference ratios into land consumption −V kl /V kw = lk.
5With CRS production, Cp is equal to the quantity of the factor whose price is p necessary to produce
one unit of output. Also recall that the unit cost of x is equal to one.
7for the factor whose price is p.6 Note that if an amenity is productive, it will lower unit costs
of the firm (η < 0) and if it is unproductive, it will raise costs (η > 0).
Simultaneously solving Equations 1.4 through 1.6 yields the factor price gradients in
percentage changes.
wˆA/Φˆ = ∆−1[−sAΦ(θr + θwBsBl ) + sAl (sBΦθwB − η)] (1.7)
wˆB/Φˆ = ∆−1[−sBΦ(θr + θwAsAl ) + sBl (sAΦθwA − η)] (1.8)
rˆ/Φˆ = ∆−1(sAΦθwA + s
B
ΦθwB − η) (1.9)
where ∆ = θr + s
A
l θwA + s
B
l θwB > 0 is the percentage of revenue from each unit of x that
accrues to land.7 As this term increases, the magnitude of all gradients decrease. That is,
as more of the total revenue generated by production is soaked up by land costs, all prices
are less able to respond to changes in amenities.
The first term in brackets in Equation 1.7 is more negative the larger the implicit
budget share of amenities (sAΦ) and the larger the amount spent on land by other agents
(θr + θwBs
B
l ) is. The value of s
A
Φ captures the direct effect of type A’s demand for amenities
while that of θr+θwBs
B
l captures the fact that as more revenue from x production is directed
toward land, less is available for type A’s wages. The second term can only be signed if the
productivity effect of amenities is known. So long as amenities are not unproductive (η ≤ 0),
the second term will be unambiguously positive and increasing with the budget share of land
(sAl ) and the amount of revenue from production that the other workers spend on amenities
6To easily derive this, write C(wA, wB , r; Φ) = CwA(Φ)w
A + CwB (Φ)w
B + Cr(Φ)r when calculating Cφ
in the total derivative of Equation 1.3 and recall that Cp is the cost-minimizing amount of input whose price
is p necessary to produce one unit of x.
7This is because the firm pays θr of each unit of revenue to land and θ
k
w to worker k, who spends s
k
l of
θkw on land.
8(sBΦθwB). The intuition here is that the more revenue is spent on land, the less willing workers
will be to trade off amenities for wages and the more cost savings the firm enjoys from type
B’s willingness to accept lower wages for better amenities, the more revenue is available for
type A’s wages. Equation 1.8 is symmetric to Equation 1.7.
All price gradients are increasing with the productivity of amenities. If amenities are
productive, then more productive locations will have a higher demand for land and labor,
increasing the price of both.
1.2.3 Appended Model
It is not possible to sign Equations 1.7 to 1.9 without imposing more structure on the
model. The single-crossing assumption first described in Elickson (1971) imposes enough
structure on the model to derive clear predictions on the signs and relative magnitudes of
the wage gradients conditional on the productivity effect of amenities.8
Assumption 1 VΦ
Vr
is decreasing in w.
This assumption requires wealthier workers to be willing to pay a greater rent premium
for an increase in amenities. Figure 1.1 displays a graphical interpretation of the assumption
by plotting worker indifference curves in {Φ, r} space. Holding utility constant, the rents
that a worker is willing to pay will be monotonically increasing with amenities according to
the implicit function theorem.9
Consider the location with rent and amenity level defined by the crossing of the two
indifference curves displayed in Figure 1.1. Assume without loss of generality that in the
location under question wA > wB. According to Assumption 1, Type A workers will then be
8This assumption is commonly employed in sorting models to achieve stratification of households by
income. See Epple et al (1984) and (1993), Epple and Sieg (1999), Walsh (2007), and Banzhaf and Walsh
(2008) for examples.
9Too see this, apply the implicit function theorem to V (rj , w
k
j ; Φj) = V
k and note that VΦ > 0 and
Vr < 0.
9more willing to accept an increase in rents in exchange for better amenities for any amenity-
rent point than type B workers. This will ensure that the workers’ indifference curve cross
only once in {Φ, r} space and is depicted in Figure 1.1 by the steeper slope of type A’s
indifference curve.
Elickson (1971) first used the single-crossing assumption to explain why jurisdiction
boundaries were so persistent and why wealthy jurisdictions were only willing to enter co-
operative agreements on public good provision with those similar to them in wealth. The
single-crossing condition ties willingness to pay for local public goods or amenities to in-
come, giving rise to income stratification similar to that found in club goods when the only
difference across members is income (Jaramillo et al, 2003). This condition has also found
empirical support. Epple and Sieg (1999) provide an empirical test for the single-crossing
condition using crime and school quality measures as amenities. The authors show that the
condition holds for the Boston Metropolitan Area using 1980 Census data.
In what follows, it is useful to reinterpret Assumption 1 in terms of budget shares
of land and amenities. By suppressing location subscripts and assuming without loss of
generality that wA > wB, Assumption 1 can be rewritten as
V AΦ
V Ar
<
V BΦ
V Br
.
Multiplying both sides by (−Φ/r) and applying Roy’s identity yields
sAΦ
sAl
>
sBΦ
sBl
,
where skl = (rl
k/wk) is the budget share of land and skΦ = (VΦ/V
k
w )(Φ/w
k) is interpreted as
the implicit budget share of amenities for type k. Assumption 1 allows for the signing all
price gradients conditional on amenities’ effects on productivity as discussed below.
To completely characterize the signs and relative magnitudes of the price gradients
when preferences satisfy the single-crossing condition, it is useful to first solve for the values
10
of η at which each price gradient switches sign. From Equation 1.7 it can be shown that
(wˆA/Φˆ) Q 0 as
η R sBΦθwB − (sAΦ/sAl )(θr + θwBsBl ) ≡ η∗wA . (1.10)
Likewise, from Equation 1.8 it can be shown that (wˆB/Φˆ) Q 0 as
η R sAΦθwA − (sBΦ/sBl )(θr + θwAsAl ) ≡ η∗wB . (1.11)
Finally, Equation 1.9 implies that rˆ/Φˆ Q 0 as
η R sAΦθwA + sBΦθwB ≡ η∗r . (1.12)
It is relatively straightforward to show that η∗wA < η
∗
wB < η
∗
r when preferences exhibit
single-crossing.10 However, additional information on preferences is required in order to
determine the difference in wage gradients,
(
wˆA
Φˆ
− wˆ
B
Φˆ
)
= ∆−1(−θr(sAΦ− sBΦ)− (1− θr)sBl sAl [(sAΦ/sAl )− (sBΦ/sBl )] + (sBl − sAl )η). (1.13)
Equation 1.13 reveals that knowledge of relative budget shares is required to determine the
difference in wage gradients. Three possible cases exist under Assumption 1 and each is
discussed in detail below. In what follows, I define the value of η at which Equation 1.13
equals zero as η˜.
1.2.4 Case 1: sAΦ ≥ sBΦ and sAl < sBl ⇒ ηl ≤ η˜
Case 1 requires that the budget share for amenities be increasing with income and the
budget share for land be non-increasing with income. This case is the most realistic as the
10See appendix for proof.
11
income elasticity of land has repeatedly been shown to be less than unity,11 which implies
budget shares that decrease with income, and local amenities are generally thought to be
luxury goods. Empirical evidence of the latter is provided in Chapter 2.
Figure 1.2 displays the relative values of all price gradients over the range η when
amenities have a Hick’s neutral effect on productivity.12 Notice that it is possible for all
prices to be increasing with amenities if amenities are sufficiently productive (η sufficiently
negative). This would be the case if amenities are productive enough for the firms to value
land more than both workers. Under this scenario, both types of workers must be compen-
sated for rent premiums that are excessive according to their preferences.
For expositional purposes, imagine a situation where a Hick’s neutral productivity effect
of amenities changes in a particular location where all price gradients are positive and all
else is held constant. This thought experiment decreases the firm’s value of amenities while
holding the workers’ values constant. As amenities become less productive (η increases), the
profitability of firms and thus the demand for all inputs at that location decreases, putting
downward pressure on all prices. If rents fall below type A’s willingness to pay for land, the
firm will be able to capitalize on the workers’ surplus by lowering wA. Thus, wˆ
A/Φˆ is the
first gradient to turn negative since type A’s willingness to pay higher rents for amenities is
more responsive to the change in amenity levels, followed by wˆB/Φˆ, since type B workers’
responsiveness is not as great.
If amenities become unproductive enough (η sufficiently positive), the decrease in de-
mand for land from the firms and workers will cause the rent gradient to become negative.
In this situation, amenities are unproductive enough so that if amenities were to improve, (Φ
increase) the decrease in demand for land from lowering productivity and thus wages would
outweigh the increase in land demanded from workers due to migration.
11See Mayo (1981) for a review of early studies and Hansen et al (1998) for evidence from Lorenz curve
approach as well as the traditional approach. The general conclusion from this line of research is that income
elasticities of housing is less than unity, even when elasticities are allowed to vary by income.
12Under single-crossing, η∗wB ≷ 0 is also possible. All other thresholds (η∗wA , η∗r , and η˜) are guaranteed to
be the sign they are shown to be in Figure 1.2 and η∗wA < η
∗
wB < η
∗
r will always hold.
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Finally, note that at a sufficiently positive value of η, the wage gradients cross and
type B workers will suffer a greater wage penalty than type A workers. Roback (1988)
states that if sAl < s
B
l and s
A
Φ > s
B
Φ , then wˆA/Φˆ < wˆB/Φˆ. However, as shown in Figure
1 and observed in Equation 1.13, this is only true if η is not too large. It is theoretically
possible for amenities to be unproductive enough (η > η˜) so that Equation 1.13 becomes
positive. Intuitively, if amenities are sufficiently counterproductive so that rents are actually
decreasing with amenities, type B workers, who are assumed to spend a greater portion of
their income on land, benefit more from lower rents and thus be willing to give up a greater
percentage of their income rendering wˆB/Φˆ < wˆA/Φˆ < 0 possible.13
Therefore, if amenities are luxury goods and land is a necessary good, then type A’s
wage gradient will be less than type B’s whenever rents are increasing with amenities. Given
the empirical evidence that the income elasticity of land demand is inelastic, rents increase
with amenities, and the generally held belief that amenities are luxury goods, these assump-
tions are likely to hold in the data.
The prediction on the relative magnitudes of the wage gradients is added to the re-
sults, which are summarized by Figure 1.3. All results listed above the η axis hold under
Assumption 1. The results shown below the axis are specific to the case where sAΦ > s
B
Φ
and sAl < s
B
l . Given the empirical support of this case in the literature and the evidence
presented in the next chapter, I expect Equation 1.13 to be negative empirically, implying
local wage distributions that contract with better amenities.
As can be seen from Figures 1.2 and 1.3 and derived in the appendix, type A’s wage
gradient will be less than type B’s whenever the conditions for Case 1 are satisfied and the
rent gradient is positive. Therefore, the three conditions which together are sufficient for
the prediction of contracting wage distributions are that housing shares be decreasing with
wage, amenity shares be increasing with wage, and rents be increasing with amenities.
Proposition 1 ∂(wˆ/Φˆ)
∂w
< 0 if ∂sl
∂w
< 0, ∂sΦ
∂w
> 0, and (rˆ/Φˆ) > 0.
13See appendix for proof.
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The intuition behind Proposition 1 is as follows. Both worker types pay the same rent
premium for amenities in any location yet type A workers are more willing to do so. There-
fore, type B workers must be compensated for rent premiums that are excessive according
to their willingness to pay by forgoing less wages than type A.
1.2.5 Case 2: sAΦ > s
B
Φ and s
A
l > s
B
l ⇒ η˜ < ηA
This case differs from the first in that it requires the budget share spent on land to
increase with income, which is opposite of what the empirical literature finds. Taken with the
assumption on the implicit budget share for amenities, this implies the budget share for the
consumption good is decreasing with income, which also seems unlikely to hold empirically.
However, if this is were the case, then the sign of the difference in wage gradients as described
by Equation 1.13 would be monotonically decreasing with η. As observed in Equations 1.7
and 1.8, the slopes of the wage gradients are proportional to the workers’ budget shares
of land. Therefore, whichever worker has the larger budget share of land will have the
steeper slope and thus the higher (lower) gradient for sufficiently productive (unproductive)
amenities. Figure 1.4 shows that the wage gradient for type B workers is above that of type
A for low values of η whereas the reverse is true in Figure 1.2 under Case 1.14 Intuitively,
this is because as amenities become more productive to the firm, rents are bid up for all
agents but effect the worker that spends a larger percent of his income on land relatively
more.
The results of Case 2 are summed up in Figure 1.5 with those above the axis holding
under Assumption 1 and those below the axis being specific to Case 2. Under these assump-
tions, one would predict Equation 1.13 to be negative if all price gradients were positive and
negative if one wage gradient was found to be negative. This case is not likely to hold in the
data due to the ample evidence in the literature that budget shares for land decrease with
income.
14See appendix for proof.
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1.2.6 Case 3: sAΦ < s
B
Φ and s
A
l < s
B
l ⇒ ηB < η˜ < ηl
Case 3 differs from the preferred Case 1 in that it requires the budget share of amenities
to be decreasing with income. As in Case 1, if the budget share of land is decreasing with
income, Equation 1.13 will be negative for low values of η and monotonically increase with η.
The difference here is that Equation 1.13 switches signs at a lower η than the rent gradient.
Thus, even if rents increase with amenities, one can no longer predict with certainty which
wage gradient is greater. What can be said in this case is that Equation 1.13 will be negative
if any worker has a positive wage gradient and positive if rents decrease with amenities.
Comparing this case to the preferred Case 1, the lower wage workers now have a
greater range of possible η values under which their wage gradient is less than the higher
wage workers.15 This is because compared to Case 1 they are willing to allocate a greater
budget share towards amenities. This case is not likely to hold empirically as the condition
on the amenity budget share is generally thought to increase with income, that is, amenities
are generally thought to be luxury goods. Empirical evidence supporting this notion is
provided in the next chapter.
1.3 Conclusion
The model in Roback (1989) extended the seminal work of Roback (1982) to allow for
wages that differ within locations. Wage and rent gradients are characterized but without
imposing further structure on the model, predictions on gradient signs and relative magni-
tudes cannot be inferred. Using the single-crossing condition originally proposed by Elickson
(1971) to explain the empirically observed income stratification of households, I am able to
provide a more detailed characterization of all price gradients and derive testable predictions.
Using previous findings on the income elasticity of housing, positive rent gradients, and as-
suming amenities are luxury goods, the results presented here imply local wage distributions
15See appendix for proof.
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that contract with amenities.
The prediction stated in Proposition 1 is consistent with the findings of similar models
that separate workers by their education (Beeson, 1991; Moretti, 2004; and Black et al,
2009) skill level or occupation (Lee, 2010), or preferences (Ng, 2009). The key innovation
here is that rather than separate workers somewhat arbitrarily by education, skill, or any
other discrete variable that may split a sample, I employ an empirically tested assumption
that describes how the willingness to pay for amenities evolves with income. Since more
education and higher-skilled occupations are positively correlated with income, I argue that
the results found in the papers mentioned above are at least partially explained by the model
presented here.
Although local governments are not formally modeled here, the results suggest inter-
esting tax implications. If households are willing to pay more to live in higher amenity
locations, one might expect a local government to be able to extract more taxes from the
residents. However, it may be possible for an improvement in amenities to decrease tax
revenue. The contraction of the wage distribution may result in lower income tax revenue
overall, especially if taxes are progressive. This may or may not be offset by an increase in
property tax revenue.
A second tax implication exists for policy makers who value equity. If policy makers
observe only income and housing prices, they may overcompensate low-wage workers with
transfers, sacrificing more efficiency than is necessary and essentially subsidizing firms. That
is, if increased land rents drive up wages in the lower end of the wage distribution, transfers
such as subsidized housing may be promoting lower wages without much effect on worker
utility.
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Figure 1.1: Single-Crossing Condition
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Figure 1.2: Example of η and the Price Gradients - Case 1
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Figure 1.3: Qualitative Summary of η and the Price Gradients - Case 1
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Figure 1.4: Example of η and the Price Gradients - Case 2
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Figure 1.5: Qualitative Summary of η and the Price Gradients - Case 2
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Figure 1.6: Example of η and the Price Gradients - Case 3
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Figure 1.7: Qualitative Summary of η and the Price Gradients - Case 3
Chapter 2
The Effect of Amenities on Local Wage Distributions: Empirical Evidence
2.1 Introduction
In Chapter 1, I derived the prediction that local wage distributions will contract with
better amenities. Using a difference-in-differences approach to identify the effect of amenities
on wage quantiles, I show that wage distributions do in fact contract with an improvement in
amenities as workers at the lower end of the wage distribution earn more while those at the
higher end earn less. Since amenity-wage gradients (henceforth wage gradients) are found
to differ in sign and magnitude systematically with wage level, the average wage gradient
generally estimated in the literature will be greatly misleading for most workers. A sufficient
condition for the prediction to hold is for rents to be increasing with amenities, housing to
be a necessary good, and amenities be luxury goods. In the empirical analysis presented
below, all three parts of the sufficient condition are shown to hold in the data.
Estimating wage gradients separately at different points in the wage distribution is
important for at least two reasons. First, average wage gradients are misleading, especially
for the workers whose actual wage gradients are not the same sign as the average. Previous
work has sometimes estimated wage gradients that are inconsistent with Roback’s (1982)
original model where the wage gradient is not allowed to differ by wage level.1 Second, it
1For example, when using the “traditional hedonic model”, Bayer et al (2009) estimate a positive relation-
ship between amenities (lack of air pollution) and wages using an OLS regression and an insignificant positive
relationship using instrumental variables. Gyourko and Tracy (1991) estimate a negative wage differential
for the disamenity student/teacher ratio.
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allows us to observe amenity valuation separately by wage income, which may be more of
interest to policy makers. For example, these estimates may be used to make more precise
predictions on changes in the tax base due to a change in amenities, particularly when
income taxes are progressive. Estimating the implicit price paid for amenities at different
points in the wage distribution also enables us to show that the share of income spent on
amenities increases with wage level. This result confirms what has often been assumed but
never empirically shown, namely, that amenities are luxury goods.
The empirical results in Section 2.4 relate to previous results that separate workers
by education (Roback, (1988); Beeson, (1991); Moretti, (2004); and Black et al, 2009) or
occupation (Lee 2010). Roback (1988) estimates the effect of several amenities on wages
separately by education group.2 Her reported coefficients differ across education group but
not in any discernible pattern and it is not reported whether they are significantly different
across group or not.
Beeson (1991) illustrates how returns to schooling may theoretically decrease with
amenities. Her theory predicts that the wage gradient should decreases with wage level
when the education elasticity of amenities is greater than the education elasticity of housing,
which in turn is greater then the education elasticity of the numeraire. The theoretical
prediction in Chapter 1 involves assumptions that are less restrictive (involving assumptions
on two elasticities rather than three) and have empirical support. Empirically, Beeson (1991)
finds that the return to education does in fact change with amenity levels but the direction
seems dependent on the amenity in question. Specifically, the return to education is not
decreasing with every amenity.
The productive amenity under study in Moretti (2004) is the percentage of workforce
that has a college degree. An increase in the supply of college educated workers in an MSA
is shown to increase wages of all education groups. This “social return” to education is
2The amenities measured in her paper are crime rate, unemployement rate, particulate matter pollution,
population, population density, population growth, and heating degree days. The education groups are less
than high-school degree, high-school degree, and college degree
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estimated to decrease as education increases. In more recent work, Black et al (2009) show
that the return to a college education, as measured by the ratio of wages of college graduates
to those of high-school graduates, is lower in cities with higher housing price residuals, which
the authors use as a measure for local amenity values.
Finally, in a model that separates worker type by skill level, Lee (2010) uses city
population as a proxy for amenities and estimates wage gradients that decrease with the skill
of occupation within the medical sector. However, he was unable to show the same pattern
for workers outside of the medical sector. In the results presented here, wage distributions
are shown to contract with amenities for multiple industry-occupation groups.
The results presented here contribute to our understanding of how local amenities
are valued by demonstrating that wage gradients decreasing as wage level increases holding
education, and industry-occupation group constant. So if a college-educated worker increases
his wage level without changing his industry-occupation group, the results here would predict
that he would implicitly pay a greater amount for his local amenities through forgone wages
than he previously did. In contrast, the results in Roback (1988), Beeson (1991), Moretti
(2004), and Black et al (2009) imply that the effect of amenities on wages remains constant
for all college-educated workers while those in Lee (2010) imply the effect remains constant
across skill level (occupation).
Since both education and skill (occupation) are positively correlated with wage income,
it is not possible to tell if previous results reflect a difference in preferences across education
groups, occupations, or wage levels.3 Thus, the problem in considering previous approaches
to separating workers in the data is that they do not explicitly tie wage gradients to relative
wage levels. The advantage of the approach taken here is that wage gradients are allowed to
vary across wage level within education and industry-occupation groups. Therefore, the dif-
ferences in wage gradients reported here are due to differences in wage levels, not differences
3However, given the nature of the specific productive amenity in Moretti (2004), it is most likely that the
correct separation for that study is in fact education group.
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in education or sklll level of occupation.
The majority of previous studies on amenity valuation have estimated price gradients
from cross sections of micro level data. Since it is difficult to control for, let alone identify,
all the local amenities that are capitalized into rents and wages, these studies almost surely
suffer from omitted variable bias. For example, tropical storms and hurricanes are correlated
with proximity to the ocean, which is itself an amenity. Thus, failure to control for ocean
proximity will bias workers’ value of tropical storms upward and, in the worst case scenario,
make it appear that hazardous weather is an amenity. In the data used here, some omitted
amenities such as ocean proximity, national monuments, etc. do not vary across the time
period under study. Therefore, I follow Bayer et al (2009) by using a difference-in-differences
approach to alleviate the possible omitted variable bias present in cross-sectional estimates.
2.2 Empirical Strategy
In this section, the prediction that local wage distributions contract with amenities is
empirically tested. There are three empirical challenges to overcome in the process. First,
the theoretical model does not provide a clear cutoff point that defines when a worker is
high-wage and when he is low-wage. Second, the wage income observed in the data is top-
coded, artificially restricting the variation in wages observed at the very top of the wage
distribution. Lastly, estimates are likely to suffer omitted variable bias from unobserved
factors that are correlated with observed amenities. The manner in which each of these
issues is dealt with is described below.
To avoid arbitrarily setting a cutoff for when a worker is considered high-wage or low-
wage, quantile regressions are employed to analyze the impact of an increase in amenities
across the distribution of wages (Koenker and Basset, 1978). This not only sidesteps the
possible selectivity bias in separating the sample on the dependent variable, but provides a
richer description of amenities’ effect on wages. Extending Proposition 1 from the previous
chapter to the quartile wage regressions estimated here leads to the prediction that the
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estimated coefficients on the amenity index will decrease with wage quantile. This would
yield evidence that the low-wage workers are trading off less wages (or being compensated)
for residing in high-amenity (high-rent) locations compared to high-wage workers.
A well-known problem with using Census data is that the income variable is top-coded
to protect the privacy of individuals.4 For this reason, coefficients are estimated via the
censored quantile regressions first proposed by Powell (1984, 1986a) by using the simple
algorithm described in Buckinsky (1994).5 To determine the effect of the control variables
on the qth quantile, the censored quantile regression employed here finds the vector β(q) and
constant γ(q) that solves
min
β(q),γ(q)
1
N
∑
ijt
ρ(q)(wijt −min{w0jt,x′ijtβ(q) + γ(q)Φjt}) (2.1)
where ρ(q)(λ) ≡ (q− Iλ<0)λ is the tilted absolute value function or the “check function”, wijt
is the natural log of wage income, w0jt is the censoring value, and xijt is a vector of wage
controls.6 Subscripts i, j, and t denote individual, location, and time respectively. Location
here is defined as the Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA). The minimization problem is
then iteratively resolved using only observations whose estimated conditional quantile wˆ
(q)
ijt
is less than the censoring value w0jt until convergence is achieved.
This procedure is applied to the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 90th wage quantiles. The
coefficients of a quantile regression are interpreted analogously to those of a least-squares
regression. For example, γˆ(10) is interpreted as the effect of a one unit increase in the amenity
index on the 10th quantile of the wage distribution. If local wage distributions contract with
amenities, we would expect to see γ(q) < γ(q
′) for all q > q′.
Empirical studies that estimate quantile regressions over the distribution of wages
41.98% of the workers in the sample used here have top-coded wages.
5An alternative estimator is suggested in Buchinsky and Hahn (1998) but was shown to take more than
twice the amount of computing time to estimate. Given the large sample size used here, this estimator was
not used.
6The censoring values differ across states and years in the Census data. Thus, it is written with a time
and location subscript.
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generally estimate bootstrapped standard errors from 100 repetitions (Buchinsky, 1994;
Machado and Mata, 2005; Poterba and Rueben 1994). Due to the large data set used
in this study, it is not practical to do so here. Therefore, I estimate bootstrapped standard
errors from 100 repetitions only for the coefficients estimated from regressions where cen-
soring is an issue. For the remaining coefficients, the estimated standard errors are those
reported by STATA, which are estimated using the method suggested by Koenker and Bas-
sett (1982) with the density of the residuals at zero estimated by the method described in
Rogers (1993).7 Finally, for comparison with previous literature, the effect of amenities on
average wages is also estimated using a least squares regression.8
To alleviate omitted variable bias present in cross-section estimates, I follow Bayer et
al (2009) by using a difference-in-differences approach. The coefficients on the amenity index
are identified off its variation across time while controlling for other MSA factors via fixed
effects. If the coefficients of interest were estimated using only a cross section of data, the
amenity index and the MSA fixed effects would have a one-to-one relationship, prompting us
to use only the amenity index. The index would then be correlated with any MSA-specific
factor, which would likely bias the estimates in an unknown direction.
However, by using MSA fixed effects and variation of amenity scores across time, we
are able to alleviate this potential bias. The estimated relationship for each conditional
quantile is
w
(q)
ijt = x
′
ijtβ
(q) + γ(q)Φjt + ϕ
(q)
j MSAj + 
(q)
ijt , (2.2)
where xijt contains a year indicator. The difference in wages of individuals residing in the
same MSA across time identifies γ(q). For example, the difference between the wage of
7Poterba and Rueben (1994) estimated both bootstrapped and analytical standard errors and found the
differences between them to be small. The same result is found here where using either standard error would
not change the confidence level with which any of the coefficients are estimated.
8The symmetrically censored least squares estimate is more appropriate here as a measure of the average
effect of amenities on wages. However, in this particular case, the censoring did not pose an issue and thus
the estimation reduces to OLS.
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observation 2 in location 1 in year 2 and observation 1 in location 1 in year 1 is
w
(q)
212 − w(q)111 = (x212 − x111)′β(q) + γ(q)(Φ12 − Φ11) + (q)212 − (q)111, (2.3)
which identifies γ(q). The MSA terms drop out here as both observations reside in the same
location.
Only unobservables that are fixed over time will be controlled for by the MSA indica-
tors. Any MSA-specific effect that is variable across time and correlated with the index may
still effect the estimates. In particular, there may be unmeasured productivity shocks whose
change across time is correlated with the change in the amenity index. However, these omit-
ted variables could bias the results towards showing wage distributions that contract with
the amenity index only if the change in the omitted productivity shocks disproportionately
increase wages at the bottom of the wage distribution or disproportionately decrease wages
at the top of the distribution.
The coefficients on the amenity index are estimated on the full sample as well as
separately by aggregate industry-occupation group as defined by the Census.9 While Lee
(2010) was unable to find wage gradients that decreased with income for occupations outside
of the medical sector, the methodology employed here is able to do so.
2.3 Data
Data for this study come primarily from the US Census 1990 and 2000 5% microdata
samples (Ruggles et al, 2008). From this sample I use full-time10 non-hispanic white males
that claim to be the “head of household”, are not students or in the military, and are between
the ages of 25 and 55 to ensure that location decisions were driven by those that are not
looking for locations in which to retire and may be expected to have amenities capitalized
9Aggregate ocupations used here are Managerial and Professional, Technical-Sales-Administrative, and
Precision Production-Craft-Repairers. Aggregate industries used are Construction, Manufacturing, Retail
Trade, Professional and related services.
10A worker is designated full-time if he reported working at least 35 hours a week and 48 weeks a year.
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in their wages.11 Furthermore, only individuals that could be identified with an MSA for
which amenity values were available were kept in the sample.12 This left me with 689,714
observations in 266 MSA’s for 1990 and 764,585 observations in 293 MSA’s for 2000.
In the wage regressions, each individual’s wage and salary income is used as the de-
pendent variable. The control variables are total hours worked in the last year (calculated
from average hours worked in a week and total weeks worked), age, potential experience,13
categorical dummies for education, the ability to speak English, work disabilities, marital
status, MSA of residence, and a year dummy. Squared terms for age and potential experience
are also included.
To test the model’s assumption that rents increase with amenities, rental rates and
housing values are regressed on housing characteristics and the amenity index in Section
2.5.1. The dependent variable used is reported rental rates for renters and the reported value
of the house for owners. Descriptive variables include the housing unit’s, acreage, categorical
variables for age of the unit, type of heating used, number of other units physically attached,
existence of complete plumbing, number of bedrooms, phone availability, MSA location, and
indicators for having a kitchen and ownership of the unit.14
The amenity data is obtained from the Places Rated Almanac, a semi-regular publica-
tion of location specific amenity measures used to construct rankings of metropolitan areas.
MSA’s in the United States (and Canada) are scored in several categories and then ranked
according to their overall score. For the amenity index Φjt, the scores of all categories that
did not include data on wages or housing costs were obtained from the Places Rated Al-
11Graves and Waldman (1991) find that retirees sort to locations with low rates of wage capitalization.
12Some MSA definitions in the Census data differed slightly from those in the Places Rated Almenac,
which is used to construct the amenity index here. Those found to have differences were dropped from the
sample.
13Potential experience was calculated by exp = age − agework where agework is the youngest age at
which an individual could have been employed. Most papers use agework = years in school + 5 However,
this yields agework < 16 for individuals who graduated early, which was not legal in the US for the time
period under study. For these cases, I assume agework = 16.
14This indicator is used in place of multiplying housing values by a constant to convert them to monthly
rents. In this way, I let the data decide the most appropriate adjustment rather than enforce an arbitrary
value as is generally done in the literature.
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manac 1989 and 2000 editions: climate, crime, arts, recreation, healthcare, education, and
transportation.
In the 1989 edition, Places Rated describes the methodology of scoring each category
and lists both the scores and the ranks of MSA’s for each category and overall. However,
in the 2000 edition, only percentiles are reported for each category. For example, the MSA
ranked first in an amenity category has a score (percentile) of 100 for that category. For this
reason, once all MSA’s that did not match the Census sample were dropped, I recalculated
the percentiles for every remaining MSA and each category separately for both years and
used these in place of the scores. The amenity index for any MSA in a particular year is
then constructed as the sum of scores (percentiles) across all categories.
Although the data sources are mostly consistent across years, one caveat to the Places
Rated data is that the methodology to scoring the MSA’s for each category is altered slightly
across years. These alterations range from small to relatively significant. For example, the
crime category scoring methodology is identical across years but uses 5 year averages in
1989 and 8 year averages in 2000. However, the climate category’s scoring is altered more
significantly. In the 2000 edition, information is added to the scoring procedure (hazardous
weather measures, seasonal effects, etc) that was not included in the 1989 edition.
To address the above listed data issues, three strategies were implemented. First, the
quantile wage regressions were estimated with the individual categories of amenities taking
place of the amenity index. In this way, the pattern of wage gradients may be observed
by category and if a single category is deemed to be flawed in measurement, it need not
affect the others. This approach also allows the categories to have unequal weights in worker
preferences opposed to the amenity index. Second, the wage regressions were estimated seven
additional times, removing a single category form the index one at a time. Lastly, the effect
of a change in the precision of the amenity measure over time, which is how the differences
in scoring is viewed here, on the estimates is tested using a Monte Carlo expirement.
Results from these tests are discussed in Section 2.5.2 and no evidence is found of the
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data artificially forcing the results presented here. Note that in order for the measurement
error of the amenity index to cause the results, it must be that the change in measurement
across years favors the amenity measures of MSA’s whose wage distributions contracted
relatively more than the others over the sample time period. I find no reason to believe that
this is occurring.
Descriptive statistics for the change in amenity measures are presented in Table 2.1
and a geographic distribution of the change in the amenity index across time is displayed in
Figure 2.1. The bins in Figure 2.1 were constructed so that each contain 20% of the MSA’s.
Correlations of the change in amenities across time are presented in Table 2.2. The changes
in category percentiles are mostly uncorrelated as the largest of these, the correlation of the
change in recreation and the change in health care, takes a value of 0.263.
The relationship between amenities and wage distributions that I seek to identify across
time can be observed absent additional controls in Figure 2.2. The change in each MSA’s
amenity index is plotted against the change in that MSA’s interquartile range of log wages.
Although most MSA’s saw an increase in their interquartile range, those with a larger increase
in their amenity index had less of an increase or a decrease in their interquartile range of
wages. The plot is, however, merely suggestive. The effect that local amenities have on
wages distributions is identified in the next section controlling for worker characteristics and
MSA fixed effects.
2.4 Results
2.4.1 The Effect of Amenities on Local Wage Distributions
The results from the quantile wage regressions are presented in Table 2.3. In addition to
the full sample results, results from quantile regressions run on aggregate industry-occupation
groups with more than 75,000 total observations are also displayed. The coefficients are
scaled up so that they may be interpreted as the percentage change in wages due to a
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100 point increase in the amenity index (this is equivalent to increasing a single amenity
category from worst to best). Notice the significantly positive coefficients on most of the
lower quantiles. This is evidence that low wage workers are compensated with higher wages
in the presence of better amenities. Likewise, negative signs on the coefficients for the higher
quantiles is evidence of high-wage workers trading off wages for amenities.
The results confirm that wage distributions contract with amenities. All groups have
coefficients that are positive for the lowest quantile and generally monotonically decrease
as quantile increases. Only three coefficients, that from the 75th quantile regression for ad-
ministrators and sales representatives in retail (row 4) and managers in professional services
(row 5) and that from the median regression for managers in manufacturing (row 6), do not
follow the monotonically decreasing pattern. However, these increases in coefficient values
are not likely significant.15 In all but one group, administrators and sales representatives in
retail (row 4), the coefficient eventually becomes negative as quantile increases. The lack of
negative coefficients for this group indicates that these workers do not earn enough to give
up wages for better amenities.
The results in Table 2.3 may at least partially explain the results in Beeson (1993),
Moretti (2004), Black et al (2009), and Lee (2010). Opposed to the aforementioned studies,
I show here that wage distributions contract within education and industry-occupation
groups. That is, it is not differences in education or skill level of occupation that is causing
the results found here. Furthermore, I am able to show contracting wage distributions for
multiple industry/occupation groups outside of the medical sector.
2.4.2 Average and Median Wage Gradients
To compare the methodology used here to the previous literature and illustrate the
importance of the former, the average wage gradient is estimated by OLS to compare to the
15I am unable to statistically test that the coefficients are monotonically decreasing with quantile. To do
so requires simultaneous estimation of all censored quantile regressions. Due to the length of computing time
necessary for such an estimation, the approach was not taken here.
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quantile regression results. The standard errors are clustered by MSA-year and the results
are presented in Table 2.4. The median regression from Table 2.3 is also presented for a
separate measure of central tendency.
The coefficients from both regressions are positive but not significant. Using either
regressions to test the model in Roback (1982) with one type of worker, the insignificant
coefficients would imply that amenities have no effect on wages. This may be true for the
worker with the average or median wage but is certainly not true for all workers as observed
by the coefficients in Table 2.3. When taken as representative of all workers, the OLS and
median regression results in Table 2.4 overestimate the wage gradient for high-wage workers
and understate that of low-wage workers.
2.4.3 Estimated Implicit Prices Across the Wage Distribution
Since workers do not explicitly pay for local amenities, they will pay for them implicitly
through rent premiums and forgone wages. The implicit price of an amenity is the additional
income spent on land plus the forgone wages due to the presence of the amenity. Implicit
prices are often constructed from average wage and rent gradients to value local amenities,
environmental goods, and public goods and/or to measure the quality of life. If wage gra-
dients differ across workers, then the implicit price paid for local amenities will likely differ
as well. If these differences are great, the standard approach of estimating mean implicit
prices may not be useful, particularly when equity is valued or when a particular income
group is the subject of concern. The implicit price paid for amenities can be derived from
the equilibrium condition for each worker as
P k ≡
(
V kΦ
V kw
)
= lk
dr
dΦ
− dwk
dΦ
(2.4)
or in percentage terms as
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P k
wk
= skl
d log r
dΦ
− d logw
k
dΦ
, (2.5)
where V k is indirect utility for workers of type k, skl is the budget share of land, and s
k
Φ is
the implicit budget share of amenities. Recall that all workers are assumed to have the same
rent gradient in each location but are allowed to have different wage gradients and budget
shares for land. Here each worker earning the qth quantile wage is treated as a separate
worker type and the budget share for housing is substituted for the budget share for land.
To compare the implicit shares of income spent on amenities, we must hold constant
both the amenity index and the price of housing that each quantile worker faces so that only
wage differs across the workers. Thus, this analysis must be carried out at the MSA level
rather than the national level where housing prices and the amenity index will differ across
the workers.
The implicit price is estimated for each wage quantile in Chicago, the MSA with the
largest number of observations.16 An estimate of the share of income devoted to housing is
used as a proxy for the share of income devoted to land. This is estimated for both years
and for each quantile by finding the qth quantile wage earner and taking his housing share
value as the estimate.17 The rent and wage gradients are taken from Table 2.3. The pattern
of implicit prices across wage quantile are qualitatively the same across years. To conserve
space, only those reports from the 2000 Census are displayed here in the first row of Table
2.5.
The numbers reported in the first row of Table 2.5 are interpreted as the percentage
of income a worker is willing to pay for a 100 point increase in the amenity index (equal to
an improvement from worst to best in a single category). The monotonicity in the implicit
16Implicit prices were also estimated for all industry/occupation groups with qualitatively similar results
and not presented here for brevity.
17Monthly rent and yearly wage divided by 12 was used to calculate the housing share. If the observation(s)
owned their housing unit, its value is converted into monthly rent by subtracting the estimated coefficient
on ownership from the censored median regression on rents/home values. If more than one worker earned
wages equal to the qth quantile wage earner, the median of their housing shares was used.
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prices mimics that observed in the coefficients on the amenity index in the wage regressions;
larger quantiles pay more for amenities. Interestingly, some workers have negative estimated
implicit prices. This implies that their wage gradient is positive and dominating the rent
gradient in their implicit price. That is, they must be compensated above and beyond what
is necessary for them to purchase an equal amount of housing when amenities improve.
These estimated implicit prices demonstrate the importance of thinking beyond mean
valuations for amenities when equity is of concern. The estimates vary greatly over the
wage distribution of workers in Chicago.18 These differences hold important implications
for policy makers. For example, this suggests that policy makers that subsidize low-income
housing in cities with high rent premiums may be sacrificing more efficiency than is necessary
since low-income workers are compensated with wage premiums. However, the results are
only suggestive with respect to this matter. A full analysis would entail formally modeling
local governments that take into consideration the migratory responses to changes in local
amenities and prices.19
2.5 Assumption and Robustness Checks
2.5.1 Assumption Checks
Three conditions that together are sufficient for the prediction of contracting wage
distributions are that rents increase with amenities, land shares decrease with wages, and
implicit amenity shares increase with wages. Each of these conditions are tested below and
found to hold in the data.
To test the assumption that rents are increasing with amenities, a symmetrically cen-
sored least squares (SCLS) regression (Powell, 1986b) and a censored median regression of
18Implicit prices also vary within the wage distributions of aggregate industry/occupation groups. These
results are not shown here but available upon request.
19The model presented here does not consider taxes, local government, or publicly provided goods. For a
model that deals with such issues in a Roback (1982) framework with one type of worker, see Albouy (2009)
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the rental rate or housing values on housing characteristics and amenities are estimated.20
The SCLS estimation equation is
Pijt = min{(P 0,ownjt ), h′ijtβh + γhΦjt + ijt}, (2.6)
where Pijt is the natural log of monthly rental rate (reported value of unit if owned), P
0,own
jt
is the censoring value conditional on ownership status,21 hijt is a vector of housing unit
characteristics listed in Section 2.3 and Φjt is the amenity index. The algorithm for SCLS
“recensores” the data from below to restore symmetry in the errors and estimates OLS coef-
ficients on observations with predicted values below the top-code. The analogous conditional
median is estimated from a censored median regression and the coefficient is also reported.
I expect to see positive coefficients from both the SCLS and the censored median
regression on rents and housing values. Since this result is standard in the literature, the
sign and significance of the coefficients serve as a test of how noisy of a measure the amenity
index is. If the signs of these coefficients are not positive or significant, then the amenity
measure may not be precise enough to accurately measure amenities’ effect on the wage
distribution. The results for rents are presented in Table 2.6. Due to the time intensity of
the estimations, estimating bootstrapped standard errors is not practical. Reported standard
errors are those estimated from the last iteration of either algorithm clustered by MSA-year.
The signs of both coefficients are positive and significant with 99% confidence. This
is evidence that the amenity index constructed here is sufficient for empirically measur-
ing local amenities. Mean and median rental rates and housing values would increase by
approximately 3.7% and 4% respectively with a 100 point increase in the amenity index.
The estimated implicit prices can be used to check the assumption that the share of
wages spent on amenities is increasing with wage (∂sΦ
∂w
> 0). The assumption that land
shares decrease with wage (∂sl
∂w
< 0) is also verified by the data. Table 2.5 displays the
202.5% of owners and 4.0% of renters have top-coded housing values and rents respectively in the sample.
21Rents and housing values have separate top-codes.
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estimates of amenity and housing shares as well as their ratio for each quantile of the full
sample using estimated shares for workers in Chicago from the 2000 Census.22 Housing
shares are decreasing with income and amenity shares are increasing with income. Thus,
the sufficient conditions for the prediction on relative wage gradients to hold are present in
the data. Furthermore, the increasing shares of wages spent on amenities constitute the first
empirical evidence that amenities are indeed luxury goods, as is often assumed.
2.5.2 Robustness Checks
One potential issue with the analysis above is that one cannot tell how much variation
across time is due to the slight alterations in scoring methods and how much is due to actual
variation in amenities. Although weather patterns do change over time, the variation in
the climate category displayed in Table 2.1 seems too high to be strictly a result of actual
variation in climate conditions. Some outliers are due to the addition of hazardous conditions
in the 2000 edition of the Places Rated Almenac. As a robustness check, I removed each
category one at a time from the amenity index and reran the quantile regressions for the
industry/occupation groups. My analytical results were qualitatively the same across all
specifications.23
To allow amenities to have differential effects on wage quantiles, the amenity index
was split into its composite categories and the empirical analysis was repeated. To conserve
space, only the estimated coefficients on the individual amenity categories for the largest
group, Managers in the Professional services industry, are presented in Table 2.7. For the
most part, the pattern of decreasing coefficients holds but is not as strong as the results
in Table 2.3. The biggest exception is the crime category. The most striking result is the
significant coefficient for the 90th quantile.
A possible explanation for the positive coefficient on crime for the 90th wage quantile is
22The same pattern is observed for each industry-occupation group and across years but not presented
here for brevity.
23These results are not presented here but available upon request.
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that those workers with very high wages may reside in neighborhoods with private security
and/or gated communities that are privately funded. This would be consistent with a recent
study on the funding of security in California. Cheung (2008) finds evidence that local gov-
ernments in the large cities of California spend less on police the more private government
expenditures there are. The private governments considered in his study are planned com-
munities that tax their residents for services such as security. This can be modeled here as an
additional cost of living (or higher housing costs) for the workers in the upper wage quantiles
that dwell in planned communities. This additional housing cost for high-wage workers who
live in these communities force the capitalization of security (or lack of crime amenity) into
housing costs for these workers. This would result in their wage gradients being greater than
they otherwise would be. The significantly positive coefficient on the crime index for the
90th wage quantile is consistent with this scenario.
Finally, to test if refinements of the measurements used in The Places Rated Almanac
across time could be driving my statistical results, a Monte Carlo experiment was conducted
using simulated data with an amenity measure that improved in precision over time. A total
of 10,000 simulations were run using a model where amenities were constructed to effect all
wage quantiles the same and an amenity measure that is relatively less precise in one year.24
If the increase in precision of the amenity measure is forcing the results, I would see a pattern
in the coefficients similar to the results presented here. The experiment did not suggest any
bias of the amenity coefficients in either direction. In particular, estimated coefficients were
not systematically decreasing with quantile. Details are located in the appendix.
2.6 Conclusion
Proposition 1 derived in the previous chapter is tested here by estimating the amenity-
wage gradient separately by wage quantile. Wage distributions are shown to contract empir-
ically as high-wage workers are found to earn less, and low-wage workers are found to earn
24A constant positive, negative, and zero effect of amenities on wages were all tested.
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more in locations with better amenities.
Three empirical challenges are encountered in measuring the effect of amenities on wage
distributions: deciding which workers are high-wage and which are low-wage, the presence of
top-coded wages, and omitted variable bias. The quantile regressions employed to estimate
wage gradients separately by wage quantile sidesteps the issue of choosing a high-wage/low-
wage cutoff point. The problem of top-coded wages is dealt with by estimating censored
quantile regressions using Buchinsky’s (1994) algorithm. Finally, The omitted variables bias
was alleviated by using a difference-in-differences strategy.
The assumptions of the model that are sufficient for wage gradients to decrease with
wage level (ie wage distributions to contract) as amenities improve are shown to be satisfied
in the data. Rents are found to increase with amenities, housing shares are found to decrease
with wages, and amenity shares are found to increase with amenities. To my knowledge,
this last result serves as the first empirical evidence that amenities are indeed luxury goods
as the literature often assumes.
The results of this study tie together previous work that may also imply that local wage
distributions contract with better amenities. The results of Beeson (1991), Moretti (2004),
Black et al (2010) indicate that the returns to education decrease with amenities while Lee
(2010) finds similar results with the return to skill in the medical industry. Since skill and
education are both positively correlated with wage levels, the theory and results presented
here, which control for education and skill via industry-occupation controls, suggest that
previous results may be largely due to the manner in which amenities are capitalized across
wage levels.
Although local governments are not formally modeled here, the results suggest inter-
esting tax implications. If households are willing to pay more to live in higher amenity
locations, we might expect a local government to be able to extract more taxes from the
residents. However, it may be possible for an improvement in amenities to decrease tax
revenue. The contraction of the wage distribution may result in lower income tax revenue
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overall, especially if taxes are progressive. This may or may not be offset by an increase in
property tax revenue. To solve this problem, a local government must be formally introduced
to the model. This is left for the topic of future research.
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Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics of the Change in Amenity Scores
Category Mean Standard Deviation Min Max
∆Climate -0.27 31.43 -58.41 86.81
∆Healthcare -0.01 18.92 -61.72 52.34
∆Crime 0.59 14.64 -50.20 54.33
∆Transportation 0.23 24.82 -82.08 65.49
∆Education 0.50 21.77 -65.47 66.17
∆Art 0.24 18.17 -69.90 56.68
∆Recreation 0.05 23.92 -81.71 76.65
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Table 2.2: Correlation of Amenity Changes Across Time
Variables ∆health ∆crime ∆transport ∆edu ∆art ∆rec ∆climate
∆health 1.000
∆crime -0.092 1.000
∆transport 0.162 -0.123 1.000
∆edu 0.059 -0.127 0.068 1.000
∆art 0.059 0.046 -0.014 0.254 1.000
∆rec 0.263 -0.055 0.151 0.014 0.021 1.000
∆climate 0.041 -0.057 0.158 -0.150 -0.009 -0.111 1.000
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Legend
(-173,  -36)
(-36, -4)
(-4, 30)
(30, 65)
(65, 199)
Change in Amenity Scores (1989-1999)
Figure 2.1: Change in Amenity Index (1989-1999)
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Table 2.4: The Effect of Amenities on Average and Median Wages
Regression Amenity Index Coefficient N
OLS 0.472 1,454,299
(0.560)
Median 0.097 1,454,299
(0.164)a
standard errors are in parentheses
a analytical standard errors reported by STATA in the last iteration
Table 2.5: Housing Shares, Amenity Shares, and Implicit Prices in Chicago (1999)
quantile
90 75 50 25 10
Implicit Price of Amenity Index (P (q)/w(q)) 2.326 1.058 0.652 -0.281 -1.590
Amenity Share (sqΦ) 0.983 0.465 0.296 -0.131 -0.765
Housing Share (sql ) 0.124 0.125 0.151 0.180 0.240
Ratio (sqΦ/s
q
l ) 7.911 3.723 1.957 -0.729 -3.183
Implicit Price is percent of wage income implicitly paid for a 100 unit increase in Φj
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Table 2.6: The Effect of Amenities on Average and Median Rents
Regression Amenity Index Coefficient N
SCLS 3.738*** 1,454,299
(1.252)
Median Regression 4.046*** 1,454,299
(0.000)
standard errors are in parentheses.
Table 2.7: The Effect of Individual Amenities on Local Wage Distributions
quantile
Amenity 90 75 50 25 10
Climate -7.344** -2.055 -2.177* 1.055 3.531*
(3.125)a (1.494)a (1.192) (1.295) (1.999)
Health Care -3.137 2.88 -0.448 0.959 0.317
(5.006)a (2.411)a (1.929) (2.096) (3.244)
Education -11.525 ** -6.84 ** -2.811 0.594 5.353
(5.851)a (2.835)a (2.261) (2.453) (3.806)
Recreation 0.107 0.948 3.13* 3.921** 5.137*
(4.604)a (2.223)a (1.777) (1.927) (2.979)
Arts 5.893 5.652 0.712 1.477 -5.701
(7.367)a (3.633)a (2.916) (3.170) (4.893)
Transport -5.159 -6.038*** -5.347*** -5.537*** -1.839
(4.319)a (2.081)a (1.664) (1.808) (2.787)
Crime 1.176** -1.946*** -1.747 -2.498 -5.606
(7.088)a (3.44)a (2.753) (3.002) (4.649)
standard errors are in parentheses
a analytical standard errors from last iteration
Chapter 3
The Migratory Response to Racial Wage Disparity
3.1 Introduction
In the previous chapters, I predicted that wage distributions would contract with better
amenities and showed empirical evidence that this had occurred across metropolitan statis-
tical areas (MSA’s) using 1990 and 2000 US Census data. The final chapter investigates the
out-of-equilibrium behavior of a specific group of workers, full-time black male workers, and
their migratory responses to a specific amenity, namely, local levels of discrimination.
Since the emancipation of black slaves in the South, black-white economic equality has
been approached in many dimensions but never fully achieved. From a starting point of
essentially no wealth, little skills, and no education, the black worker has acquired better
education, increased mobility, and greater access to all occupations.1 Yet a significant dif-
ference still exists with his (or her) white counterpart. White workers still earn more, are
more likely to be employed, work more hours, have better education, more work experience,
and are less likely to work part-time or work in the public sector.
These differences themselves are, and have been, vastly different across time and geo-
graphic space. Careful and rigorous research has uncovered much in the way of explaining
the differences across time in black-white economic status measured through wages, wealth,
or employment. Little of this work, however, has been focused on the great variation in
black-white differences across geographic space at a smaller scale than simply North and
1See Altonji and Blank (1999) for a review of the literature covering black and white economic inequality.
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South.2 I undertake a more detailed analysis using Census data covering the years 1989 and
1999 by estimating unexplained racial wage gaps at the metropolitan statistical area (MSA)
level.
The contributions of this paper are threefold. First, I estimate unexplained racial wage
gaps at the MSA level for the continental United States in 1989 and 1999. Second, I find
a break from the historical causes of the distribution in gaps across space as described in
Sundstrom (2007). Lastly, I show how the variation in wage gaps across space has affected
the migration decisions of black labor.
The study most closely related to ours on a geographic scale is Sundstrom (2007), which
estimates the racial wage gap at the State Economic Area (SEA) level in the South from 1940
to 1960. Sundstrom (2007) finds that the racial wage gap was substantially greater in local
labor markets that had a greater supply of black workers, were more urbanized, were located
in plantation districts, and/or were in locations where whites exhibited racist preferences
by voting for Strom Thurman in the 1948 Presidential election. The author suggests that
the geographical distribution of the magnitude of the wage gaps may be a legacy of the
distribution of slaves as the percentage of an SEA that was once enslaved is found to be a
better predictor of the wage gap than the contemporaneous percentage of the SEA that is
black. Similar to Sundstrom (2007), I measure the effect of location-specific factors, both
current and historic, on the estimated wage gaps. Using more recent data, I find, in contrast
to Sundstrom, that historic factors are not as important in explaining the variation in wage
gaps as are current factors.
Vigdor (2002) presents a discrete choice model of black migration similar to ours where
the worker’s location decision is modeled as a function of location-specific factors such as
predicted earnings, black population, southern location, etc. It is assumed that migratory
behavior to the north is evidence of black residents’ willingness to pay to avoid racial tensions
2Two notable exceptions cited here are Sundstrom (2009), who estimates wage gaps at the State Economic
Area (SEA) level for the South and Charles and Guryan (2008), who estimate wage gaps at the state level.
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of the south. In the study presented here, I explicitly control for racial tension in each location
using the estimated MSA-level unexplained wage gaps as a proxy.
I can not say how much of these gaps are due to discrimination. However, recent
evidence suggests that it may be a significant portion. Using questions measuring racial at-
titudes form the General Social Survey, Charles and Guryan (2008) estimate the percentage
of the unconditional wage gap due to discrimination to be as much as one quarter of the
absolute (explained plus unexplained) wage gap. As I do not directly control for discrimina-
tion in the analysis, its effect will be partially captured in the estimated unexplained wage
gaps.
This is the first study that I know of to identify directly if the differences in unexplained
wage gaps are a motivating factor of labor migration or location choice. Since the differences
in local wage gaps have been shown to be positively correlated with levels of discrimination,
I expect to see a migratory response from black labor. In particular, I expect black workers
to migrate from MSA’s with relatively high unexplained wage gaps to those with relatively
low gaps. Contrary to this line of reasoning, black workers are found to be less likely to
leave MSA’s with higher unexplained wage gaps and more likely to choose them conditional
on migrating. When comparing the differential effects of the unexplained wage gap across
race, I find that blacks are less likely to leave MSA’s with higher unexplained wage gaps and
more likely to choose such MSA’s relative to their white counterparts.
3.2 Empirical Strategy
3.2.1 Estimating Local Wage Gaps
The empirical approach to measuring local unexplained wag gaps consists of two steps.
First, I construct a human capital index that represents each worker’s value to the national
labor market. Second, I decompose the differential returns to this index across race for each
MSA. The unexplained difference in returns to this index across race is then used as a proxy
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for discrimination at the MSA level. I then test if this proxy is a motivating factor of black
labor migration and location choice.
The human capital index, HCi, for each worker is constructed by estimating
ln(wrijt) = αt +X
r′
ijtβt + γBIblack + γAIasian + γHIhispanic + 
r
ijt → {αˆt, βˆt} (3.1)
separately for 1989 and 1999 on the sample of full-time working white, black, asian, or
hispanic males who were neither students nor enlisted in the military and were between the
ages of 18 and 55.3 Here, ln(wrijt) is the natural log of annual wage income, Xijt includes a
vector of ones, marital status, indicators for aggregate occupation and industry, education,
age, potential experience, squared terms for age and potential experience, indicators for
citizenship and ability to speak english, interactions of birth-state and race, and Ir is an
indicator for race r.4 Subscripts i, j, and t denote individual, MSA, and year respectively.
From this national regression, the human capital index is constructed as
HˆC
r
ijt ≡ αˆt +Xr
′
ijtβˆt (3.2)
for each individual. This is the predicted returns to X variables a white worker would receive
estimated from the national sample, assuming βˆt does not vary across race. Note that MSA
indicators were not used in equation 3.1. Therefore, the human capital index assigns an
“average location” to each worker.
The difference in mean wages between black and white workers are then decomposed
separately in each MSA-year using HˆCijt as the only predictor. That is, for each MSA-year
3A worker is designated full-time if he reported working at least 35 hours a week and 48 weeks a year.
4Card and Krueger (1992) show that relative school quality across race accounts for 20% of the narrowing
of the wage gap between 1915 and 1966. Furthermore, it was found that over 90% of school-aged children
in 1940 were living in their state of birth and 82% of all blacks born in between 1990 and 1945 grew up in
their birth-state. Thus, these interaction variables are meant to control for school quality that may differ by
race and state. However, Card and Krueger’s (1992) tabulations are from data sets much older than those
used in the analysis so it is possible that these percents are lower in the data if black school-aged children
are more mobile in the sample than they were in the 1940’s.
50
I estimate separately
ln(wwijt) = α
w
jt + θ
w
jtHˆC
w
ijt + ν
w
ijt → {αˆwjt, θˆwjt} (3.3)
on the sample of white workers and
ln(wbijt) = α
b
jt + θ
b
jtHˆC
b
ijt + ν
b
ijt → {αˆbjt, θˆbjt} (3.4)
on the sample of black workers. If θˆbjt = 1, then location j pays black male workers the same
returns at time t for their human capital as the national average across locations and races.
Likewise, θˆbj ≶ 1 implies that location j pays black male workers less than or greater than the
national average respectively. Theoretically, there is an inherent identification problem here
since by construction HˆCijt = f(ln(w), ·). Thus, HˆCijt is correlated with νijt. However, this
correlation is extremely small since HˆCijt is a function of all wages whereas the left hand
side of equations 3.3 and 3.4 is an individual’s wage.
The main advantage in using the human capital index in place of controlling for all
variables separately is that I am able to include MSA’s with relatively small numbers of black
full-time male workers in the sample. If I were to estimate Equations 3.3 and 3.4 separately
by race for each MSA using all available control variables, the regressions would not have
sufficient degrees of freedom to accurately estimate coefficients for many MSA’s with a small
number of full-time black male workers.
Once the human capital index is constructed for each worker and the coefficients from
Equations 3.3 and 3.4 are estimated, I construct a “two-fold” decomposition that utilizes
“non-discriminatory” coefficients α∗ and β∗ to weight the contribution of explained and
unexplained differences5
5This approach is suggested and described in Neumark (1988).
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ln(wwjt)− ln(wbjt) = (HC
w
jt −HCbjt)θˆ∗jt︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ejt
+ (αˆwjt − αˆ∗jt) +HCwjt(θˆwjt − θˆ∗jt) + (αˆ∗jt − αˆbjt) +HCbjt(θˆ∗jt − θˆbjt)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ujt
,
where HC
r
jt is the average human capital among all workers of race r in location j at time
t, Ejt is the explained portion of wage differences, Ujt is the unexplained portion, and α
∗
jt
and θ∗jt are estimated from
ln(wrijt) = αjt + θjtHC
r
ijt + δ
B
jtIblack + δ
A
jtIasian + δ
H
jt Ihispanic + µ
r
ijt → {αˆ∗jt θˆ∗jt}, (3.5)
which is estimated separately for each MSA-year using all races.
Recent evidence suggests that the wage discrimination faced by college-educated black
workers is far less than those with only a high-school degree (Arcidiacono et al, 2010). This
may imply that black workers should be more responsive to local wage gaps that are specific
to their education status. The estimation of the unexplained wage gaps is then carried out
two additional times, once on the sample of men without college degrees, and once on the
sample of men with college degrees. In sum, each MSA-year has three estimated unexplained
wage differences between black and white workers: one that includes all workers (Ujt), one
that is specific to college-educated workers6 (U cjt), and one specific to non-college-educated
workers (Uncjt ). The education-specific wage gap is constructed as
U eduijt =

U cjt if i college educated
Uncjt otherwise.
(3.6)
These wage gaps are then regressed on historic and current MSA factors to account for
6A worker is denoted ”college-educated” if he is listed as having 4 or more years of college education.
52
their spatial differences separately for each year
Uˆjt = γ
′
tMjt + jt, (3.7)
where Mjt contains regional dummies, historical and current percentages of population that
is black, percent slave in 1860, and percent of workers covered by a union contract. Since
Uˆjt is an estimate from a previous regression, jt will be heteroskedastic. Thus, Equation 3.7
is weighted by the inverse of the estimated standard errors of the Uˆjt’s.
3.2.2 Probability of Migration
In the final stage of analysis, the unexplained wage gaps are treated as location-specific
characteristics in two discrete choice models. The first models the decision to migrate,
while the second models choice of MSA residence conditional on migration. The estimated
coefficients from these models can show if the local unexplained wage gaps are a motivating
factor for migration and if they influence selection of MSA conditional on migrating.
The worker’s decision to leave his current MSA is modeled as a binary choice in a logit
framework. If the unexplained wage gaps are controlling for local discrimination or racial
attitudes, then I would expect to see workers leaving MSA’s with larger unexplained wage
gaps. This test is carried out twice, once using the overall unexplained wage gaps and once
using the education-specific wage gap.
Following recent work analyzing the migratory behavior of labor (Chen and Rosenthal,
2008; McKinnish, 2008), I separate the individuals into education/marital status groups as
first described in Costa and Kahn (2000). Single men with and without college degrees are
referred to as “non-power singles” and “power singles” respectively. Likewise, married men
without a college degree whose spouses also do not have a college degree are referred to as
being a member of a “non-power couple”. If one member of the couple has a degree then the
individual is part of a “partial power couple”. Lastly, if both individuals of the couple have
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college degrees then the individual is referred to as being a member of a “power couple”.
The probability that worker i moves to a different MSA is modeled as
Pij =
eβ
′xi+γ′Mj+δ′zij
1 + eβ′xi+γ′Mj+δ′zij
, (3.8)
where xi includes the worker’s group status (non-power single, power couple, etc), age, and
age squared. For married workers, xi also includes their spouse’s wage and an indicator for
their spouse’s birth-state along with the number of school-aged children in their household.7
MSA-level controls contained in Mj include the unexplained wage gap, the interquartile
range of wages (IQR), lagged percent of in-migrants and out-migrants for both races, annual
unemployment rate, overall population, population that is black, percentage of population
that is black, and black and white housing indexes measuring the cost of housing in an MSA
separately by race. Since I cannot control for everything affecting migration at the MSA
level, a separate specification is estimated with all MSA-level controls replaced by MSA fixed
effects.
Finally, zij contains both the number of workers in MSA j who are employed by the
same industry and the number of workers employed by the same occupation, an indicator
for birth-state, and indicators for group status interacted with the unexplained wage gap,
the IQR of wages, and the black and a white housing indexes.
The main coefficients of interest are those on the interactions of group status with
the unexplained wage gap, IQR, and the housing indexes. If the unexplained wage gap is
controlling for local levels of discrimination, I would expect it to have positive coefficients
that increase across group status as the education level of the group increases. For example,
I would expect to see a larger positive coefficient on the interaction term of the unexplained
wage gap and partial-power couples than on that interacted with non-power couples since
7Children that were between the ages of 5 and 18 five years ago (the earliest the migration decision
could have been made) were counted as school-aged children. This will count some older children as being
school-aged who were not, biasing the effect toward zero. The magnitude of the reported coefficient will thus
be a lower bound.
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partial-power couples are expected to be more mobile with one college educated worker
and earn a higher income. The latter should increase the willingness to pay to avoid the
disamenity discrimination as discussed in the previous chapters.
Likewise, if the housing indexes are controlling for local amenities, I would expect the
higher-powered groups to be more likely to reside in MSA’s with higher valued housing in-
dexes and the lower-powered groups to be less likely to do so. On the other hand, the black
housing index may be less correlated with local amenities than it is with local discrimina-
tion. It may be that blacks pay a higher rental rate for housing than whites in an MSA
due to discrimination in the housing market. If this discrimination effect on black housing
prices/rental rates outweighs the amenity effect, I would expect all black workers to be less
likely to reside/locate in MSA’s with higher valued black housing indexes.
3.2.3 Location Choice
The effects of MSA characteristics on migrants’ choice decisions are estimated using
a conditional logit framework on the sub-sample of workers who migrated to a new MSA
between 1994 and 1999. The probability that worker i chooses MSA j is modeled as
P [Yi = MSAj|zij,Mj] = e
γ′Mj+δ′zij∑J
j=0 e
γ′Mj+δ′zij
(3.9)
where Yi is the choice made by worker i, Mj contains population, black population, percent-
age of population that is black, lagged percent of outmigrants and inmigrants for both races,
the unemployment rate, the unexplained wage gap, IQR, and the black and white housing
index for MSA j, and zij includes interactions of group status with the MSA’s unexplained
wage gap, the IQR of wages, and housing indexes, indicators for birth-state, birth-state of
spouse, and if the couple is located in the birth-state of both members, predicted natural
log of wages, distance (and distance squared) from previous MSA, number of workers in the
same industry, number of workers in the same occupation, and number of blacks who had
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migrated between j and i’s previous location.8 This last variable controls for black networks
or endogenous migration costs as modeled in Carrington et al (1996).
If the unexplained wage gaps are correlated with local levels of discrimination, then I
expect to estimate negative coefficients on the unexplained wage gap. This would indicate
that the probability of a black migrant worker choosing an MSA decreases the more blacks
are paid less in that MSA for unexplained reasons. Furthermore, I expect these coefficients to
be decreasing across group status as the education level of the group increases. For example,
I expect the coefficient on the interaction term for power couples to be more negative than
that on non-power couples. If the housing indexes are correlated with amenities, I would
expect the coefficients on the interaction terms of group status and the housing indexes
to be negative for low-powered groups and positive for high-powered groups. If the black
housing index is more correlated with discrimination, I would expect the coefficients on
the interaction terms of group status and the black housing index to be negative for black
workers.
3.3 Data
Data for this study come primarily from the US Census 1990 and 2000 5% microdata
samples (Ruggles et al, 2008). Population counts for 1990 and 2000 were obtained from the
full sample (available at census.gov). The unit of observation is any full-time employed male
between the ages of 25 and 55 who is classified as white, black, hispanic, or asian according
to the US Census.9 An individual here is defined as black or white only if he is non-hispanic.
All hispanic individuals were classified as hispanic regardless of being listed as black or white.
Historical factors from the 1930 Census (Ruggles et al, 2008) and the Slave Census
8For each individual-choice pair, this variable will equal the count of all black individuals regardless of age
or sex in the Census who migrated from the individual’s previous MSA to the choice under question between
1984 and 1989. A similar conditional logit was estimated using all previous migrants and all previous non-
black migrants between each city pair as a control. The magnitude on the black migrants was the greatest
out of the three specifications yielding evidence that race-specific networks are more important than general
geographic networks.
9Native American and others are excluded.
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of 1860 (Menard et al, 2004) were used as controls in the regression of unexplained wage
differentials. The percentage slave for each MSA was calculated for 1860 using the 1860
Slave Census, the percentage of population that was black in 1930 was estimated using the
1930 Census, and the percentage of workers covered by union contracts were obtained from
Hirsch and Macpherson (2003). Indicators were also used for geographic regions as defined
by the Census.
Finally, I construct an MSA-level quality-adjusted housing price index developed by
Chen and Rosenthal (2008) separately for blacks and whites. For any given race, the index
prices the “average house” for that race in each MSA. These indexes should be positively cor-
related with local amenities (Roback, 1982) or possibly with housing market discrimination
in the case of the black housing index.
The kernel density estimates of the unexplained wage gaps in 1989 and 1999 are dis-
played in Figure 3.1. The unexplained wage gaps are approximately normally distributed
and very similar across years. The unexplained wage gaps (in natural logs) range from -0.27
to 0.41, implying as much as a 31% premium or a 64% penalty on black wages depending
on location.10
The geographic distributions of unexplained wage gaps for both years are displayed
in Figures 3.2 and 3.3. As may be expected, the MSA’s with the highest unexplained
wage gaps in 1989 were predominantly located in the South. The MSA’s with the smallest
unexplained wage gaps or small wage premiums were mostly contained within the “rust belt”.
This is likely due to the presence of unions, which not only constrain employers ability to
discriminate, but may force them to pay an equal wage to black workers with lower levels
of human capital for the same job as a white worker with more human capital. This would
explain, at least in part, the small wage premium seen in these MSA’s.
Figure 3.3 displays the geographic distribution of unexplained wage gaps in 1999. Both
10The minimum wage gap of -0.27 is an extreme outlier. The next highest wage gap is approximately -.04,
implying a premium for being black of only 4%.
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the MSA’s with the highest and those with the lowest wage gaps are more dispersed than in
1989. Although the South still maintains most of the “worst” MSA’s and the rust belt has
most of the “best” MSA’s from a black worker’s perspective, these extreme valued MSA’s
are not as constrained geographically as they were 10 years prior.
Two questions relating to the variation in unexplained wage gaps across space are
addressed in the next section. The first question is, what explains the differences across
space in the estimated wage gaps? The second is, to what extent do these differences effect
a black worker’s migration decision and/or location choice?
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Variation in the Wage Gaps Across MSA
Current and historical explanatory variables are used as controls to explain the varia-
tion in the overall unexplained wage differences across time and space. Here I observe that
historical factors that contributed to the spatial variation in wage gaps between 1940 and
1960 as demonstrated in Sundstrom (2007) are not as important in 1989 and 1999. I also
find results that are consistent with the theoretical predictions in Becker (1957) and the
empirical findings of Charles and Guryan (2008), that the percentage of population that is
black is positively correlated with a higher unexplained wage gap.
In the seminal theoretical treatment of discrimination in the labor market, Becker
(1957) predicts, among other things, that the amount of wage discrimination in a labor
market should be increasing with the percent of the labor force that is black. The intuition
is that black workers will first sort to the least discriminating firms before obtaining a job with
the relatively more discriminating firms. A labor force that has a greater proportion of black
workers is predicted to have a higher number of black workers employed by discriminating
firms, ceteris paribus, and thus a larger wage gap.
Results from the weighted least squares (WLS) regression of unexplained wage gaps on
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MSA characteristics are presented in Table 3.1. The first three columns of Table 3.1 display
the coefficients from the regressions using the 1989 estimated unexplained wage gaps as the
dependent variable. The last three columns display those using the 1999 wage gaps. The
percentage of MSA population that were slaves in 1860 is used as an explanatory variable in
the first and fourth columns. This is replaced by the percentage of blacks in 1940 in columns
2 and 5, followed by the current percentage (1989 or 1999) of blacks in columns 3 and 6.
The results in Table 3.1 indicate a change in the historical geographic distribution of
the unexplained wage gap. Sundstrom (2007) found that percentage of past slave population
to be a better predictor of the wage gap in the time period between 1940 and 1960 then the
1939 black population. Similar to Sundstrom (2007), I find that percent slave is a better
control for the unexplained wage gap than the percent black in 1929. Switching the control
variable from percent slave to percent black in 1929 decreases the amount of variation in
the 1989 unexplained wage gaps explained by 0.1% and the amount in the 1999 unexplained
wage gaps explained by 1%. Contrary to Sundstrom (2007), using current percent black
measures yields the greatest fit for the model, increasing the amount of variation explained
by an additional 8.1% in 1989 and 4.8% in 1999. Thus, the historic geographic distribution
of blacks is not as strong a predictor of unexplained wage gaps as the current distribution.
Further evidence of the break in importance of historic factors is the fact that both percent
slave and percent black in 1929 was significantly positive in the 1989 regression but not in
1999. Thus, what remaining explanatory power the historical concentrations of blacks had
in 1989 disappeared by 1999.
The percentage of workers covered by a union contract is found to decrease the unex-
plained wage gap in 1989 but has no effect in 1999. Since union contracts restrict employers
ability to discriminate with the wages paid to workers, I would expect a negative coefficient
on percent covered. The loss in significance for this variable in 1999 may indicate a loss of
bargaining power for unions or a change in black workers’ ability to obtain union jobs. The
answer to this question, however, is beyond the scope of this paper. The loss in significance
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across years is not restricted to the percent covered by a union contract. The magnitude on
current percent black is almost cut in half between 1989 and 1999 and the R2 values in the
1999 regression are less than a third of what they are for the 1989 regression. Clearly, there
has been a change in the structure of what determines local unexplained wage gaps across
years.
These results from Tables 3.1 align with Becker’s (1957) theoretical prediction and
Charles and Guryan’s (2008) empirical findings. Charles and Guryan (2008) found that
prejudiced sentiments towards blacks as described by the General Social Survey had steadily
decreased from 1970 to 2004. According to Becker’s (1957) theory, this change in preferences
should decrease the importance of the percent black variable because a larger percentage of
black workers would be able to sort to non-discriminating employers in a location with
improved racial attitudes.
The results point to a break from the historic geographic pattern of unexplained wage
gaps observed in Sundstrom (2007). Given a black workforce that is more mobile than it
was between 1940 and 1960, I may expect this change to at least partially arise from black
workers migrating away from locations with high unexplained wage gaps in favor of those
with low or no wage gaps. In the migration section below, I test if black labor is responding
to the unexplained wage gaps as if they were a disamenity through their migratory decisions.
3.4.2 The Effect of Unexplained Wage Gaps on the Probability of Migration
In this section I look at the effect the local unexplained wage gap has on a black worker’s
probability of migrating. If the unexplained wage gap serves as a disamenity for black
workers, I would expect it to be positively correlated with a greater likelihood of migration
holding all else constant. This effect should be more noticeable in the data the more variation
there is across locations. The variation in the unexplained wage gaps presented in Figures
3.1, 3.2, and 3.3 describe wage gaps (measured in differences in log wages) that range from
−0.27 to 0.44, leading me to believe that the differences are large enough to motivate a
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migratory response.
The logit model is estimated for all full-time black male workers in the 2000 Census.11
Due to data limitations, the unexplained wage differences estimated from the 1990 Census
are used as controls for those between 1995 and 2000, the time period in which the mobile
workers of the sample migrated.
The results from the logit estimation using the sample of full-time black males are
displayed in Table 3.2. The first and third columns control for various MSA-level attributes,
which are replaced by MSA fixed effects in the second and fourth column. The omitted group
in Table 3.2 is non-power singles. The first and second column use the overall unexplained
wage gap as the dependent variable while the third and fourth use the education-specific
wage gap.12
The coefficient values listed in Table 3.2 are consistent with previous findings in the
migration literature. The tendency for a black male worker to migrate is increasing with
age but at a decreasing rate. He is less likely to migrate the more his spouse earns, the
more school-aged children he has, if he is in his or his spouse’s birth-state, and the more
workers there are of the same industry in his MSA. He is more likely to leave MSA’s where
other black individuals are also leaving and less likely to do so in MSA’s where they are
migrating to. He is, however, less likely to migrate from MSA’s that had a higher percentage
of their white population emmigrate. He is more likely to leave MSA’s with higher rates of
unemployment, more workers of his occupation, and a greater population and less likely to
leave MSA’s with black populations and higher percentages of black residents.
Mobility appears to be increasing with household education. In all columns the coef-
ficients on the group dummies suggest that power-singles are more mobile than non-power
singles. For couples, mobility also seems to increase with education as the coefficients are
11Measures of past unexplained wage differences are necessary for identification but the variable selection is
greatly altered in Census data prior to 1990. Although it is possible to estimate unexplained wage differences
for years before 1990, the estimated differences would not be comparable to those presented here.
12For partial power couples, the college-educated wage gap was used only if the man in the sample had a
college degree.
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monotonically increasing with amount of education the couple has attained.
The surprising result in Table 3.2, is that black workers seem less likely to move the
greater the unexplained wage gap is. Furthermore, the interaction terms are all negative and
monotonically decreasing with education in the first two columns. This seems to suggest that
a worker is increasingly less likely to move from an MSA with a higher unexplained wage
gap the more education he (or his household) has. This is exactly the opposite of what I
would expect if the unexplained wage gap is measuring local racial attitudes.
One may think that part of the reason there are significantly negative coefficients on
the interaction terms in the first two columns of Table 3.2 may be that the educated workers
are not affected by the unexplained wage gaps and that these gaps may be correlated with
unmeasurable characteristics that attract educated black workers. In recent work, Arcidia-
cono et al (2010) show that college educated black workers enjoy a small wage premium that
diminishes with job tenure whereas high-school educated black workers suffer a wage penalty
that also diminishes with tenure. Thus, highly educated black workers may be less likely to
leave MSA’s with greater unexplained wage gaps if the gaps are due mostly to differences in
the wages of the uneducated.
By using education-specific unexplained wage gaps as the dependent variable in Columns
3 and 4, significance is lost on many coefficients but the pattern remains largely the same.
The coefficients on the partial-power couple interaction term becomes positive, however,
this may be due to the ambiguity in deciding whether to assign the college- or non-college-
educated wage gap to these observations.
The coefficients on the IQR are positive for the non-powered groups, negative for all
others, and decreasing with power. This pattern is consistent with Roy sorting (Roy, 1951).
If part of the IQR spread is due to the reward for unobserved skills, then I should expect to
see higher skilled (powered) workers choosing to reside in locations that have larger IQR’s.
The negative coefficients indicate that the powered groups are less likely to leave MSA’s with
larger wage dispersion.
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The white housing index is expected to be positively correlated with local amenities
(Roback 1982, Black et al 2009). Even if blacks are not purchasing the same houses as
whites, the price of a white house still serves as a measure of local amenities holding the cost
of black housing constant. Thus, I expect black workers to be less likely to leave areas with
higher white housing index values.
The negative coefficient on the white housing index indicates that black workers are
less likely to leave MSA’s with a higher white housing index. This is consistent with the
hypothesis that the housing index is positively correlated with local amenities. The effect
is constant across groups save for power singles in Columns 2 and 3, who have a positive
significant interaction term. These workers may be more likely to consume the same housing
as whites, which would explain the significant positive term.
The coefficients on the black housing index are positive and significant indicating that
black workers are more likely to migrate from MSA’s with more expensive black housing.
This effect is relatively constant across groups save power singles in Column 2. Again, these
workers may behave opposite others in the sample if they are more likely to consume “white
housing”.
The results of the logit model presented in Table 3.2 indicate that black workers are
actually less likely to migrate from MSA’s that have larger unexplained wage gaps holding all
else constant. This could occur if the unexplained wage gap were correlated with unobserved
factors that make workers less likely to migrate. To test if this is the case, the same logit
model was estimated for all full-time white male workers. If the unexplained wage gap is
suffering from such omitted variable bias, I may expect to see white workers also less likely
to leave MSA’s with greater unexplained wage gaps.
The results from the logit estimation of white workers probability of migrating are
displayed in Table 3.3. Most coefficients qualitatively match those of Table 3.2. Although
all significant coefficients on the interaction terms of the unexplained wage gap are positive
for all couples in Column 4, when MSA fixed effects are employed, it is not possible to
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identify the coefficient for non-power singles and so these values only indicate that couples
have a more positive reaction to the unexplained wage gap relative to non-power singles.
The first two columns show that white workers’ response to the unexplained wage gap
is similar to that of the black workers. This may suggest that the unexplained wage gaps
are correlated with unobserved MSA characteristics not fully controlled by the MSA fixed
effects that decrease the probability of migrating. However, I cannot say for certain as a
greater unexplained wage gap may also be interpreted as white workers earning more for
unexplained reasons, which would decrease their probability of migrating, ceteris paribus.
Similar to the black sample results, the coefficients on the IQR are consistent with Roy
sorting (Roy, 1951).
White male workers are more likely to migrate from MSA’s with a greater white housing
index and less likely to do so for MSA’s with a greater black housing index. Both effects are
mitigated for power singles and power couples. The pattern of coefficients on the interaction
terms with the white housing index is consistent with the housing index controlling for
amenities as power singles and couples would be the most willing to suffer a higher housing
cost to live in MSA’s with better amenities13.
It seems likely that the unexplained wage gap, as measured here, is correlated with
MSA factors other than discrimination and that these factors are dominating its effect on
migration. If there is a discrimination component in the unexplained wage gap, I may be
able to observe its effect on black migration by pooling black and white workers in a single
logit estimation and estimating the differential effect of the unexplained wage gap across race
by interacting the unexplained wage gap interaction terms with a black indicator. If local
wage discrimination influences black workers differently from white workers, these double
interaction terms should reveal the effect.
The estimates from the pooled sample are displayed in Table 3.4. Note that black
workers are more likely to migrate as evidenced in the positive coefficients on the black
13See the first two chapters for a discussion.
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indicator. Surprisingly, the interaction term of the black indicator and the unexplained
wage gaps is negative and significant in all specifications, suggesting that the black workers
are even less likely to migrate from MSA’s with greater unexplained wage gaps than their
white counterparts. The negative coefficients on the interaction terms of the black indicator
and the IQR show that black workers are in general less likely to move from MSA’s with
higher IQR’s. However, black power singles and non-power couples have significant positive
coefficients. The double interaction terms on the housing indexes indicate that black workers
are even more (less) likely than white workers to remain in MSA’s with greater white (black)
house indexes.
Here, the unexplained wage gap was found to significantly effect black workers decision
to migrate, but in a counterintuitive manner. In what follows, I measure the effect of
unexplained wage gaps on the choice of MSA conditional on migrating.
3.4.3 The Effect of Unexplained Wage Gaps on Location Choice
In this section, I test if black workers are more likely to choose MSA’s with lower
unexplained wage gaps conditional on migrating. If black workers are migrating in this
manner, it will serve as evidence of discrimination in locations with higher unexplained wage
gaps. If the unexplained wage differences were simply due to unobservables, then I should
not see black workers migrating in response to their levels. That is, if the unexplained wage
differences are due at least in part to discrimination, then they are a disamenity that black
workers wish to flee from.
Table 3.5 reports the coefficients from the conditional logit estimation. The first column
uses the unexplained wage gap as a control variable whereas the second column uses the
education-specific wage gap. Each individual’s previous MSA was not included as a choice
for that individual as the sample was chosen conditional on migration having occurred.14
14This approach models the migration decision as separate from the locational choice decision. The
coefficients here are then interpreted as the effects on location choice given that the individual chose to
migrate.
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Most of the coefficients conform to expectations and are analogous to the logit esti-
mation results. The coefficient on the number of workers in the same occupation is now
significant and positive indicated that migrants are more likely to go to MSA’s where there
are more workers of their occupation. The additional control variable used here show that
black worker migrants are more likely to choose MSA’s that have higher predicted wages,
more previous black migrants between the worker’s previous location, and are closer in prox-
imity.
The counterintuitive result from Table 3.2 extends to location choice as well; black
workers who migrate are more likely to choose an MSA that has a higher unexplained wage
gap. The interaction terms, however, indicate that this increased likelihood is the same for
all groups. The coefficients on the IQR are once again consistent with Roy sorting as the
lower-power groups are less likely to choose MSA’s with greater wage dispersion while the
trend is reverse for power singles and couples.
Once again, the coefficients on the white housing index provide evidence of of an
amenity effect having patterns consistent with the findings in the second chapter. Namely, I
find that the interaction term on lower powered groups are insignificantly negative whereas
those on higher powered groups are significantly positive. Furthermore, the coefficients are
increasing with the education attainment of the group.
The coefficients on the black housing index are negative but insignificant for both
specifications. The coefficients on the interaction terms for power singles and partial-power
couples imply that the these groups are less likely to choose an MSA with better amenities
and that the latter are the most likely to choose MSA’s with better amenities. The coefficient
on the interaction term for power couples is also negative but not significantly so.
If the variation across MSA’s in the black housing index were reflecting local amenity
values as the white housing index appears to do, I should see that the likelihood in choos-
ing MSA’s with higher black housing index values increase with the power of the group.
However, this is not what I see here. In fact, there is evidence that the opposite is occur-
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ring, which would be consistent with the black housing index containing variation due to
differences in housing market discrimination across MSA’s. If discrimination is viewed as a
local disamenity, then the higher powered groups should be increasingly less likely to choose
MSA’s with higher black housing index values as is observed here.
I also estimate the conditional logit using the white male sample in Table 3.6 and a
pooled sample in Table 3.7. From Table 3.6 I see that white male workers who migrate
are also more likely to choose MSA’s with greater unexplained wage gaps and increasingly
likely to do so as household education increases. Although this pattern of coefficient values
is consistent with the unexplained wage gap being correlated with local amenities, it is also
consistent with white workers choosing MSA’s that pay them more for unexplained reasons.
The evidence suggests both explanations are at work. The former explanation leads me to
expect the coefficient values to increase with power of the group while the latter would lead
me to expect the education-specific wage gaps to have a more power effect. Both of these
phenomenon are present in Table 3.6.
The coefficients on the IQR for white workers are inconsistent with Roy sorting. Al-
though the non-powered groups are less likely to choose MSA’s with greater wage dispersion
as expected, the higher powered groups are even less likely. The latter result goes against
what Roy sorting would predict.
White non-power singles and couples are more likely to choose MSA’s with higher black
housing indexes while this trend is reversed for power singles and couples. These coefficient
values are consistent with the amenity explanation if local levels of discrimination in the
housing market are disamenities for white workers as well. The coefficient values on the
white housing index interaction terms are also consistent with the amenity explanation as
white workers are less likely to choose MSA’s with higher white housing indexes but this
effect is decreasing with the power of the group.
In Table 3.7, black and white male workers are pooled and the interaction terms are
allowed to differ across race. The double interaction terms of race and the unexplained
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wage gap indicate that non-power single blacks are even more likely that whites to choose
an MSA with a higher unexplained wage gap as observed in the positive coefficient on the
black-wage gap interaction term. However, the probability is decreasing with the power of
the group. Nothing qualitatively changes when the education-specific wage gaps are used in
column 2. The increasingly negative coefficient values as power of the group increases once
again suggests that the discrimination disamenity is present in the unexplained wage gap.
The remaining positive interaction of the black indicator with the unexplained wage gap,
however, remains puzzling. The results from the IQR and housing index interaction terms
are qualitatively the same as those found when the samples were analyzed separately.
3.5 Discussion
I have shown that the unexplained portion of the black-white wage gap varies greatly
over MSA’s in the United States. Charles and Guryan (2008) estimated as much as 25%
of the total wage gap is due to racial attitudes. Since I have no measure of racial attitudes
here, these attitudes should be reflected in the unexplained portion of the estimated wage
gaps. Given that workers may move freely throughout the country, I expect black workers
to migrate from MSA’s with higher unexplained wage gaps to those with lower gaps.
The results from the black sample indicate that black workers are less likely to leave
MSA’s with higher unexplained wage gaps and more likely to choose them conditional on
migrating. However, I find that white workers respond in the same manner suggesting that
the unexplained wage gap is correlated with some MSA-level amenity that is not completely
controlled for by employing MSA fixed effects.
The discrimination portion of the unexplained wage gap should effect black workers
more than white workers (that is, it should be more of a disamenity to black workers). I
identify its effect by pooling samples and interacting the variables of interest with a black
indicator. By doing so, the manner in which the unexplained wage gap differentially effects
black workers can be observed in the coefficients on the double-interaction terms. Surpris-
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ingly, I find that black workers are even more likely than their white counterparts to select
an MSA with a higher unexplained wage gap conditional on migrating. However, the proba-
bility of choosing such an MSA is decreasing with the power of the group, which is consistent
with the unexplained wage gap reflecting local levels of discrimination if discrimination is a
disamenity to black workers.
The question still remains: why would it be the case that black workers are even less
likely than their white counterparts to migrate from an MSA with a larger unexplained wage
gap and more likely to migrate to such an MSA conditional on migrating? Using data from
the National Longitudinal Surveys of Young and Mature Men, Bartel (1979) found that
roughly 50% of all moves were motivated by changes in employment (ie job loss, promotion,
etc). If employers that are able to pay a lower wage to black workers are also less likely to
fire them, then this may decrease the mobility of blacks in MSA’s with higher unexplained
wage gaps. The ability for employers to underpay black worekrs may also increase the
likelihood that these workers obtain employment. This increased probability of employment
may attract migrant black workers to MSA’s that pay them less for unexplained reasons.
However, since I do not have information on why the individuals in the sample moved, testing
such a claim would prove to be difficult.
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Table 3.1: Determinants of the Unexplained Wage Gap
Unexplained Wage Gap
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES 1989 1989 1989 1999 1999 1999
Constant 0.159*** 0.155*** 0.128*** 0.182*** 0.181*** 0.164***
(0.0158) (0.0160) (0.0161) (0.0156) (0.0160) (0.0161)
Midwest 0.015 0.016 0.013 0.016 0.016 0.013
(0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
South 0.051*** 0.047*** 0.043*** 0.021 0.027* 0.013
(0.016) (0.017) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.014)
West 0.058*** 0.061*** 0.073*** 0.037** 0.037** 0.046***
(0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
% slave (1860) 0.082*** 0.041
(0.030) (0.027)
% black (1930) 0.115*** 0.020
(0.043) (0.039)
% black (1990) 0.306***
(0.055)
% union (1990) -0.095* -0.099* -0.109**
(0.056) (0.056) (0.053)
% black (2000) 0.176***
(0.049)
% union (2000) -0.006 -0.004 -0.010
(0.056) (0.056) (0.054)
Observations 192 192 192 201 201 201
R-squared 0.256 0.255 0.336 0.053 0.043 0.101
Standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). The omitted region is the Northeast.
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Table 3.2: Determinants of Migration: Black Sample
Sample: Black Males
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Uˆ = Uˆjt Uˆ = Uˆjt Uˆ = Uˆ
edu
jt Uˆ = Uˆ
edu
jt
Constant (NPS) -2.457*** -1.143*** -2.535*** -1.160***
(0.269) (0.285) (0.273) (0.287)
PS 3.691*** 3.789*** 3.614*** 3.662***
(0.367) (0.371) (0.406) (0.415)
NPC 0.655** 0.679** 0.713** 0.701**
(0.276) (0.278) (0.279) (0.280)
PPC 2.515*** 2.607*** 1.995*** 2.092***
(0.372) (0.374) (0.395) (0.396)
PC 4.264*** 4.376*** 4.168*** 4.239***
(0.416) (0.419) (0.462) (0.471)
Uˆ (NPS) -0.142 -0.229
(0.365) (0.370)
Uˆ×PS -0.489 -0.475 -0.876 -0.733
(0.745) (0.756) (0.609) (0.541)
Uˆ×NPC -1.387*** -1.242** -0.993* -0.463
(0.537) (0.538) (0.548) (0.521)
Uˆ×PPC -1.612** -1.601** 0.897 1.029*
(0.752) (0.751) (0.658) (0.575)
Uˆ×PC -1.843** -1.858** -1.081 -0.958
(0.826) (0.835) (0.666) (0.603)
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Sample: Black Males
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Uˆ = Uˆjt Uˆ = Uˆjt Uˆ = Uˆ
edu
jt Uˆ = Uˆ
edu
jt
IQR (NPS) 0.413 0.507*
(0.283) (0.283)
IQR×PS -3.718*** -3.842*** -3.538*** -3.655***
(0.467) (0.470) (0.494) (0.500)
IQR×NPC 0.320 0.260 0.128 0.0180
(0.349) (0.350) (0.345) (0.346)
IQR×PPC -1.556*** -1.667*** -1.623*** -1.782***
(0.473) (0.475) (0.482) (0.483)
IQR×PC -3.311*** -3.445*** -3.368*** -3.508***
(0.534) (0.536) (0.563) (0.569)
HI†w (NPS) -0.037*** -0.036***
(0.009) (0.009)
HIw×PS 0.034* 0.041** 0.020 0.030
(0.017) (0.018) (0.019) (0.020)
HIw×NPC 0.004 0.004 0.0005 -3.17e-04
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
HIw×PPC -0.005 -0.003 -0.013 -0.005
(0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020)
HIw×PC 0.025 0.031 0.016 0.028
(0.019) (0.020) (0.021) (0.022)
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Sample: Black Males
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Uˆ = Uˆjt Uˆ = Uˆjt Uˆ = Uˆ
edu
jt Uˆ = Uˆ
edu
jt
HI†b (NPS) 0.028*** 0.027***
(0.008) (0.008)
HIb×PS -0.021 -0.027* -0.007 -0.016
(0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.017)
HIb×NPC -0.002 -0.002 0.001 0.001
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
HIb×PPC 0.006 0.004 0.012 0.005
(0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017)
HIb×PC -0.018 -0.023 -0.009 -0.020
(0.016) (0.017) (0.018) (0.019)
age 0.046*** 0.050*** 0.048*** 0.052***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
age squared -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001***
(1.32e-04) (1.33e-04) (1.34e-04) (1.35e-04)
ln(wage) of spouse -0.137*** -0.130*** -0.136*** -0.130***
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
# school-aged children -0.205*** -0.206*** -0.203*** -0.204***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
birth-state -0.795*** -0.842*** -0.799*** -0.837***
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.027)
birth-state of spouse -0.826*** -0.867*** -0.829*** -0.865***
(0.048) (0.048) (0.049) (0.049)
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Sample: Black Males
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Uˆ = Uˆjt Uˆ = Uˆjt Uˆ = Uˆ
edu
jt Uˆ = Uˆ
edu
jt
birth-state of both 0.226*** 0.243*** 0.212*** 0.232***
(0.059) (0.059) (0.060) (0.060)
# same occupation‡ 0.045 0.065 0.062 0.073
(0.064) (0.064) (0.064) (0.064)
# same industry‡ -0.319*** -0.304*** -0.314*** -0.302***
(0.092) (0.092) (0.092) (0.092)
% white out-migrant (1984-1989) -1.499*** -2.189***
(0.320) (0.344)
% white in-migrant (1984-1989) -0.018 -0.046
(0.124) (0.130)
% black out-migrant (1984-1989) 6.361*** 6.804***
(0.289) (0.313)
% black in-migrant (1984-1989) -0.279** -0.263**
(0.119) (0.127)
unemployement rate (1995) 3.474*** 3.647***
(0.842) (0.880)
population‡ (1989) 0.002* 0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
black population‡ (1989) -0.014*** -0.015***
(0.004) (0.004)
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Sample: Black Males
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Uˆ = Uˆjt Uˆ = Uˆjt Uˆ = Uˆ
edu
jt Uˆ = Uˆ
edu
jt
% black (1989) 0.158 0.380*
(0.193) (0.200)
MSA FE N Y N Y
Observations 113,339 113,339 111,460 111,387
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
† in $100’s.
‡ in 100,000’s.
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Table 3.3: Determinants of Migration: White Sample
Sample: White Males
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Uˆ = Uˆjt Uˆ = Uˆjt Uˆ = Uˆ
edu
jt Uˆ = Uˆ
edu
jt
Constant (NPS) -1.622*** 0.552*** -1.741*** 0.277*
(0.097) (0.161) (0.099) (0.162)
PS 3.638*** 3.565*** 3.323*** 3.201***
(0.113) (0.114) (0.128) (0.133)
NPC 0.563*** 0.594*** 0.550*** 0.571***
(0.103) (0.103) (0.103) (0.104)
PPC 2.407*** 2.423*** 2.028*** 2.026***
(0.113) (0.113) (0.122) (0.123)
PC 3.279*** 3.260*** 3.058*** 3.009***
(0.105) (0.106) (0.116) (0.121)
Uˆ×NPS -0.710*** -0.539***
(0.130) (0.130)
Uˆ×PS -1.079*** -0.937*** -0.128 -0.0171
(0.205) (0.209) (0.185) (0.153)
Uˆ×NPC 0.055 -0.064 0.179 0.383**
(0.175) (0.179) (0.176) (0.161)
Uˆ×PPC -0.211 -0.138 1.443*** 1.414***
(0.200) (0.203) (0.183) (0.144)
Uˆ×PC -0.566*** -0.408** 0.175 0.285**
(0.190) (0.194) (0.172) (0.137)
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Sample: White Males
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Uˆ = Uˆjt Uˆ = Uˆjt Uˆ = Uˆ
edu
jt Uˆ = Uˆ
edu
jt
IQR (NPS) 1.081*** 0.879***
(0.108) (0.109)
IQR×PS -3.645*** -3.623*** -3.524*** -3.527***
(0.148) (0.149) (0.160) (0.164)
IQR×NPC 0.017 0.034 -0.019 -0.066
(0.133) (0.134) (0.132) (0.132)
IQR×PPC -1.815*** -1.852*** -1.825*** -1.864***
(0.147) (0.147) (0.153) (0.153)
IQR×PC -2.583*** -2.615*** -2.503*** -2.581***
(0.136) (0.137) (0.145) (0.149)
HI†w (NPS) 0.006 0.006
(0.004) (0.004)
HIw×PS 0.006 0.012** -0.001 0.011*
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
HIw×NPC 0.018*** 0.017*** 0.016*** 0.014***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
HIw×PPC 0.010* 0.014** 0.010* 0.018***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
HIw×PC -0.002 0.006 -0.009* 0.006
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
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Sample: White Males
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Uˆ = Uˆjt Uˆ = Uˆjt Uˆ = Uˆ
edu
jt Uˆ = Uˆ
edu
jt
HI†b (NPS) -0.008*** -0.007**
(0.003) (0.003)
HIb×PS 0.008* 0.003 0.012** 0.005
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
HIb×NPC -0.012*** -0.011*** -0.010** -0.009**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
HIb×PPC 2.20e-04 -0.003 -0.002 -0.007
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
HIb×PC 0.013*** 0.007* 0.017*** 0.007
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
age -0.029*** -0.030*** -0.018*** -0.019***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
age squared -3.83e-04*** -03.84e-04*** -4.87e-04*** -4.82e-04***
(4.20e-05) (4.22e-05) (4.39e-05) (4.41e-05)
ln(wage) of spouse -0.170*** -0.171*** -0.170*** -0.171***
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
# school-aged children -0.256*** -0.257*** -0.252*** -0.253***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
birth-state -0.884*** -0.917*** -0.884*** -0.911***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
birth-state of spouse -0.877*** -0.907*** -0.878*** -0.900***
(0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
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Sample: White Males
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Uˆ = Uˆjt Uˆ = Uˆjt Uˆ = Uˆ
edu
jt Uˆ = Uˆ
edu
jt
birth-state of both 0.304*** 0.313*** 0.301*** 0.307***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018)
# same occupation‡ 0.338*** 0.385*** 0.368*** 0.405***
(0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030)
# same industry‡ -0.043 -0.038 -0.033 -0.034
(0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036)
% white out-migrant (1984-1989) 3.640*** 3.218***
(0.092) (0.111)
% white in-migrant (1984-1989) -0.101*** -0.063*
(0.033) (0.037)
% black out-migrant (1984-1989) 0.461*** 0.566***
(0.083) (0.101)
% black in-migrant (1984-1989) -0.139*** -0.200***
(0.030) (0.035)
unemployement rate (1995) 6.271*** 7.157***
(0.251) (0.275)
population‡ (1989) -0.001*** -0.002***
(3.15e-04) (3.19e-04)
black population‡ (1989) -0.009*** -0.009***
(0.001) (0.001)
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Sample: White Males
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Uˆ = Uˆjt Uˆ = Uˆjt Uˆ = Uˆ
edu
jt Uˆ = Uˆ
edu
jt
% black (1989) -0.081 -0.055
(0.065) (0.070)
MSA FE N Y N Y
Observations 937,437 937,437 876,980 876,980
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
† in $100’s.
‡ in 100,000’s.
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Table 3.4: Determinants of Migration: Pooled Sample
Sample: Black and White Males
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Uˆ = Uˆjt Uˆ = Uˆjt Uˆ = Uˆ
edu
jt Uˆ = Uˆ
edu
jt
Constant (NPS) -1.217*** 0.425*** -1.444*** 0.258*
(0.115) (0.137) (0.116) (0.137)
PS 1.654*** 1.507*** 1.389*** 1.121***
(0.161) (0.162) (0.182) (0.189)
NPC 1.212*** 1.217*** 1.185*** 1.185***
(0.139) (0.139) (0.140) (0.141)
PPC 1.599*** 1.562*** 1.569*** 1.476***
(0.157) (0.157) (0.171) (0.173)
PC 1.476*** 1.378*** 1.110*** 0.912***
(0.147) (0.148) (0.163) (0.171)
black (NPS) 1.293*** 1.374*** 1.237*** 1.175***
(0.271) (0.271) (0.270) (0.273)
black×PS -1.372** -1.336** -0.975 -0.924
(0.548) (0.548) (0.601) (0.601)
black×NPC -0.581 -0.575 -0.510 -0.501
(0.414) (0.412) (0.413) (0.414)
black×PPC -0.380 -0.453 -0.336 -0.370
(0.552) (0.550) (0.585) (0.583)
black×PC -0.282 -0.234 0.162 0.183
(0.609) (0.608) (0.671) (0.672)
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Sample: Black and White Males
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Uˆ = Uˆjt Uˆ = Uˆjt Uˆ = Uˆ
edu
jt Uˆ = Uˆ
edu
jt
Uˆ (NPS) -0.185* -0.107
(0.107) (0.109)
Uˆ×PS -2.054*** -1.961*** -0.812*** -0.389***
(0.174) (0.178) (0.171) (0.148)
Uˆ×NPC -0.050 -0.108 0.096 0.558***
(0.143) (0.147) (0.146) (0.136)
Uˆ×PPC -0.754*** -0.713*** 1.030*** 1.285***
(0.166) (0.170) (0.161) (0.131)
Uˆ×PC -1.414*** -1.333*** -0.446*** -0.0542
(0.160) (0.164) (0.156) (0.131)
black×Uˆ (NPS) -1.168*** -1.054*** -1.338*** -0.667**
(0.317) (0.322) (0.322) (0.323)
black×Uˆ×PS 0.222 0.456 0.240 -0.192
(0.684) (0.686) (0.591) (0.589)
black×Uˆ×NPC -0.736 -0.647 -0.683 -1.097**
(0.485) (0.490) (0.496) (0.501)
black×Uˆ×PPC -0.958 -0.937 -0.131 -0.626
(0.667) (0.670) (0.609) (0.606)
black×Uˆ×PC -1.341* -1.180 -0.810 -1.300**
(0.755) (0.758) (0.643) (0.640)
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Sample: Black and White Males
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Uˆ = Uˆjt Uˆ = Uˆjt Uˆ = Uˆ
edu
jt Uˆ = Uˆ
edu
jt
IQR (NPS) 0.351** 0.329**
(0.140) (0.141)
IQR×PS -0.958*** -0.828*** -1.005*** -0.896***
(0.221) (0.222) (0.252) (0.262)
IQR×NPC -0.854*** -0.821*** -0.878*** -0.967***
(0.187) (0.187) (0.187) (0.188)
IQR×PPC -0.695*** -0.658*** -1.226*** -1.226***
(0.213) (0.213) (0.232) (0.235)
IQR×PC -0.0743 0.0158 0.141 0.180
(0.200) (0.202) (0.224) (0.235)
black×IQR (NPS) -1.615*** -1.781*** -1.505*** -1.635***
(0.370) (0.371) (0.370) (0.373)
black×IQR×PS 1.970*** 1.880** 1.463* 1.545*
(0.495) (0.493) (0.524) (0.523)
black×IQR×NPC 1.172** 1.134** 1.044* 1.122**
(0.566) (0.564) (0.565) (0.567)
black×IQR×PPC 0.976 1.082 0.680 0.887
(0.759) (0.755) (0.801) (0.800)
black×IQR×PC 1.128 1.045 0.440 0.585
(0.843) (0.842) (0.923) (0.926)
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Sample: Black and White Males
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Uˆ = Uˆjt Uˆ = Uˆjt Uˆ = Uˆ
edu
jt Uˆ = Uˆ
edu
jt
HI†w (NPS) 0.009** 0.007**
(0.004) (0.004)
HIw×PS -0.005 0.006 -0.016*** -2.38e-04
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
HIw×NPC 0.018*** 0.017*** 0.015*** 0.012**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
HIw×PPC 0.006 0.012** 0.005 0.014**
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
HIw×PC -0.007 0.005 -0.016*** 0.001
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
black×HIw (NPS) -0.061*** -0.041*** -0.057*** -0.040***
(0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
black×HIw×PS 0.008 0.003 -0.011 -0.014
(0.018) (0.018) (0.020) (0.020)
black×HIw×NPC -0.007 -0.008 -0.009 -0.008
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
black×HIw×PPC -0.029 -0.033* -0.045** -0.047**
(0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020)
black×HIw×PC 0.004 -0.004 -0.019 -0.023
(0.0195) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021)
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Sample: Black and White Males
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Uˆ = Uˆjt Uˆ = Uˆjt Uˆ = Uˆ
edu
jt Uˆ = Uˆ
edu
jt
HI†b (NPS) -0.013*** -0.011***
(0.003) (0.003)
HIb×PS 0.023*** 0.015*** 0.031*** 0.021***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
HIb×NPC -0.012*** -0.010** -0.009** -0.007*
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
HIb×PPC 0.006 0.002 0.005 -0.001
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
HIb×PC 0.021*** 0.013*** 0.027*** 0.015***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
black×HIb (NPS) 0.053*** 0.037*** 0.049*** 0.036***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
black×HIb×PS -0.014 -0.011 0.004 0.004
(0.754) (0.754) (0.824) (0.825)
black×HIb×NPC 0.004 0.005 0.006 0.006
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
black×HIb×PPC 0.015 0.018 0.030* 0.031*
(0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017)
black×HIb×PC -0.014 -0.009 0.008 0.008
(0.016) (0.016) (0.018) (0.018)
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Sample: Black and White Males
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Uˆ = Uˆjt Uˆ = Uˆjt Uˆ = Uˆ
edu
jt Uˆ = Uˆ
edu
jt
age -0.022*** -0.021*** -0.011*** -0.012***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
age squared -4.86e-04*** -4.96e-04*** -0.001*** -0.001***
(3.99e-05) (4.00e-05) (0.000) (0.000)
ln(wage) of spouse -0.169*** -0.169*** -0.168*** -0.168***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
# school-aged children -0.251*** -0.252*** -0.247*** -0.248***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
birth-state -0.874*** -0.910*** -0.876*** -0.906***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
birth-state of spouse -0.873*** -0.906*** -0.874*** -0.899***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014)
birth-state of both 0.287*** 0.298*** 0.284*** 0.294***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
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Sample: Black and White Males
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Uˆ = Uˆjt Uˆ = Uˆjt Uˆ = Uˆ
edu
jt Uˆ = Uˆ
edu
jt
# same occupation‡ 0.104*** 0.160*** 0.154*** 0.207***
(0.026) (0.027) (0.026) (0.027)
# same industry‡ -0.133*** -0.125*** -0.115*** -0.112***
(0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034)
% white out-migrant (1984-1989) 3.132*** 2.596***
(0.086) (0.103)
% white in-migrant (1984-1989) -0.099*** -0.089**
(0.031) (0.035)
% black out-migrant (1984-1989) 0.977*** 1.144***
(0.078) (0.094)
% black in-migrant (1984-1989) -0.179*** -0.189***
(0.029) (0.033)
unemployement rate (1995) 5.730*** 6.727***
(0.238) (0.264)
population‡ (1989) 1.08e-04 -2.83e-04
(2.84e-04) (2.91e-04)
black population‡ (1989) -0.011*** -0.012***
(0.001) (0.001)
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Sample: Black and White Males
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Uˆ = Uˆjt Uˆ = Uˆjt Uˆ = Uˆ
edu
jt Uˆ = Uˆ
edu
jt
% black (1989) -0.013 0.102
(0.062) (0.066)
MSA FE N Y N Y
Observations 1,050,776 1,050,776 987,988 987,988
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
† in $100’s.
‡ in 100,000’s.
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Table 3.5: Location Choice: Black Sample
Sample: Black Males
Yij = 1 if i chooses MSAj between 1994 and 1999
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Uˆ = Uˆjt Uˆ = Uˆ
edu
jt
Uˆ (NPS) 4.175*** 4.606***
(0.284) (0.280)
Uˆ×PS 0.612 0.695
(0.530) (0.521)
Uˆ×NPC 0.468 0.344
(0.423) (0.413)
Uˆ×PPC 0.369 0.345
(0.564) (0.553)
Uˆ×PC 0.741 0.939
(0.605) (0.597)
IQR (NPS) -1.127*** -1.036***
(0.306) (0.307)
IQR×PS 1.092* 1.152**
(0.568) (0.568)
IQR×NPC 0.650 0.646
(0.461) (0.461)
IQR×PPC 0.584 0.623
(0.614) (0.614)
IQR×PC 1.437** 1.496**
(0.644) (0.645)
89
Sample: Black Males
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Uˆ = Uˆjt Uˆ = Uˆ
edu
jt
HI†w (NPS) -8.22e-05 -7.04e-05
(8.12e-05) (8.14e-05)
HIw×PS 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000)
HIw×NPC -1.02e-04 -8.90e-05
(1.24e-04) (1.25e-04)
HIw×PPC 3.20e-04** 3.37e-04**
(1.62e-04) (1.62e-04)
HIw×PC 3.48e-04** 3.55e-04**
(1.66e-04) (1.67e-04)
HI†b (NPS) -1.03e-04 -1.05e-04
(6.56e-05) (6.59e-05)
HIb×PS -4.17e-04*** -4.29e-04***
(1.21e-04) (1.21e-04)
HIb×NPC 7.07e-05 6.00e-05
(1.01e-04) (1.01e-04)
HIb×PPC -2.47e-04* -2.61e-04*
(1.32e-04) (1.33e-04)
HIb×PC -1.06e-04 -1.12e-04
(1.35e-04) (1.36e-04)
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Sample: Black Males
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Uˆ = Uˆjt Uˆ = Uˆ
edu
jt
population‡ (1990) 0.009*** 0.009***
(0.001) (0.001)
black population‡ (1990) -0.020*** -0.020***
(0.005) (0.005)
% black (1990) 1.222*** 0.939***
(0.156) (0.158)
% white out-migrant (1985-1990) 1.772*** 1.765***
(0.214) (0.215)
% white in-migrant (1985-1990) -0.118 -0.067
(0.078) (0.078)
% black out-migrant (1985-1990) -8.946*** -8.671***
(0.267) (0.270)
% black in-migrant (1985-1990) 1.449*** 1.348***
(0.088) (0.088)
unemployment rate (1995) -17.460*** -16.210***
(0.814) (0.810)
predicted ln(w) 0.215*** 0.216***
(0.033) (0.033)
distance in km -0.002*** -0.002***
(3.89e-05) (3.87e-05)
distance-squared in km2 3.04e-07*** 3.03e-07***
(1.03e-08) (1.03e-08)
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Sample: Black Males
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Uˆ = Uˆjt Uˆ = Uˆ
edu
jt
birth-state 2.101*** 2.095***
(0.030) (0.030)
birth-state of spouse 2.250*** 2.243***
(0.051) (0.051)
birth-state of both -1.800*** -1.797***
(0.081) (0.081)
# same occupation‡ 1.40e-05*** 1.41e-05***
(9.54e-07) (9.58e-07)
# same industry‡ 6.12e-06*** 6.18e-06***
(1.08e-06) (1.08e-06)
black migrants‡ 0.003*** 0.003***
(9.32e-05) (9.33e-05)
Observations 1,923,077 1,911,113
Standard errors in parentheses
∗∗∗p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗ p<0.1
† in $100’s.
‡ in 100,000’s.
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Table 3.6: Location Choice: White Sample
Sample: White Males
Yij = 1 if i chooses MSAj between 1994 and 1999
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Uˆ = Uˆjt Uˆ = Uˆ
edu
jt
Uˆ (NPS) 4.202*** 4.126***
(0.114) (0.112)
Uˆ×PS 1.613*** 1.870***
(0.167) (0.164)
Uˆ×NPC 0.254 0.091
(0.159) (0.153)
Uˆ×PPC 1.113*** 1.212***
(0.174) (0.170)
Uˆ×PC 1.584*** 1.942***
(0.158) (0.155)
IQR (NPS) -0.432*** -0.322**
(0.126) (0.125)
IQR×PS -1.695*** -1.529***
(0.183) (0.182)
IQR×NPC -0.253 -0.203
(0.175) (0.174)
IQR×PPC -1.577*** -1.425***
(0.192) (0.191)
IQR×PC -2.838*** -2.641***
(0.175) (0.175)
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Sample: White Males
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Uˆ = Uˆjt Uˆ = Uˆ
edu
jt
HI†w (NPS) -0.001*** -0.001***
(3.45e-05) (3.45e-05)
HIw×PS 3.98e-04*** 4.09e-04***
(4.99e-05) (5.01e-05)
HIw×NPC -2.52e-05 -3.09e-06
(4.79e-05) (4.78e-05)
HIw×PPC 1.09e-04** 1.24e-04**
(5.20e-05) (5.22e-05)
HIw×PC 3.64e-04*** 3.72e-04***
(4.67e-05) (4.69e-05)
HI†b (NPS) 2.44e-04*** 2.52e-04***
(2.71e-05) (2.70e-05)
HIb×PS -3.97e-04*** -4.00e-04***
(4.00e-05) (4.02e-05)
HIb×NPC 1.03e-04*** 8.63e-05**
(3.75e-05) (3.75e-05)
HIb×PPC -4.20e-05 -5.04e-05
(4.11e-05) (4.12e-05)
HIb×PC -2.52e-04*** -2.53e-04***
(3.72e-05) (3.73e-05)
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Sample: White Males
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Uˆ = Uˆjt Uˆ = Uˆ
edu
jt
population‡ (1990) 4.53e-04 0.001
(3.35e-04) (0.000)
black population‡ (1990) -0.038*** -0.041***
(0.001) (0.001)
% black (1990) -2.768*** -2.944***
(0.059) (0.060)
%white out-migrant (1985-1990) -0.528*** -0.590***
(0.078) (0.078)
%white in-migrant (1985-1990) 0.500*** 0.512***
(0.025) (0.025)
%black out-migrant (1985-1990) -4.604*** -4.428***
(0.083) (0.084)
%black in-migrant (1985-1990) 0.243*** 0.176***
(0.028) (0.028)
unemployment rate (1995) -16.630*** -15.890***
(0.249) (0.248)
predicted ln(w) 4.390*** 4.046***
(0.048) (0.048)
distance in km -0.002*** -0.002***
(1.20e-05) (1.20e-05)
distance-squared in km2 3.90e-07*** 3.87e-07***
(3.06e-09) (3.06e-09)
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Sample: White Males
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Uˆ = Uˆjt Uˆ = Uˆ
edu
jt
birth-state 1.886*** 1.870***
(0.010) (0.010)
birth-state of spouse 1.935*** 1.923***
(0.015) (0.015)
birth-state of both -1.295*** -1.288***
(0.024) (0.024)
# same occupation‡ 2.17e-05*** 2.23e-05***
(3.97e-07) (4.02e-07)
# same industry‡ 4.30e-06*** 4.29e-06***
(3.49e-07) (3.48e-07)
black migrants‡ (1985-1990) 0.002*** 0.002***
(3.85e-05) (3.87e-05)
Observations 18,647,222 18,501,134
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
† in $100’s.
‡ in 100,000’s.
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Table 3.7: Location Choice: Pooled Sample
Sample: Black and White Males
Yij = 1 if i chooses MSAj between 1994 and 1999
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Uˆ = Uˆjt Uˆ = Uˆ
edu
jt
Uˆ (NPS) 3.679*** 3.847***
(0.112) (0.109)
Uˆ×PS 1.577*** 1.839***
(0.163) (0.161)
Uˆ×NPC 0.358** 0.206
(0.155) (0.151)
Uˆ×PPC 1.196*** 1.308***
(0.171) (0.167)
Uˆ×PC 1.659*** 2.024***
(0.155) (0.152)
black×Uˆ (NPS) 3.910*** 4.435***
(0.282) (0.282)
black×Uˆ×PS -1.373** -1.414***
(0.535) (0.538)
black×Uˆ×NPC 0.037 0.008
(0.437) (0.436)
black×Uˆ×PPC -1.044* -1.182**
(0.570) (0.571)
black×Uˆ×PC -1.366** -1.386**
(0.603) (0.610)
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Sample: Black and White Males
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Uˆ = Uˆjt Uˆ = Uˆ
edu
jt
IQR (NPS) -0.484*** -0.410***
(0.124) (0.124)
IQR×PS -0.728*** -0.662***
(0.180) (0.179)
IQR×NPC 0.410** 0.405**
(0.173) (0.173)
IQR×PPC -0.177 -0.152
(0.188) (0.188)
IQR×PC -1.163*** -1.124***
(0.172) (0.171)
black×IQR (NPS) 0.802*** 0.865***
(0.297) (0.298)
black×IQR×PS 1.285** 1.361**
(0.554) (0.558)
black×IQR×NPC 0.052 0.053
(0.462) (0.464)
black×IQR×PPC 0.400 0.464
(0.601) (0.605)
black×IQR×PC 1.999*** 2.139***
(0.622) (0.628)
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Sample: Black and White Males
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Uˆ = Uˆjt Uˆ = Uˆ
edu
jt
HI†w (NPS) -0.001*** -0.001***
(3.39e-05) (3.40e-05)
HIw×PS 4.65e-04*** 4.63e-04***
(4.92e-05) (4.95e-05)
HIw×NPC 3.51e-05 4.78e-05
(4.71e-05) (4.72e-05)
HIw×PPC 2.06e-04*** 2.08e-04***
(5.11e-05) (5.14e-05)
HIw×PC 4.60e-04*** 4.53e-04***
(4.59e-05) (4.62e-05)
black×HIw (NPS) 4.47e-04*** 4.32e-04***
(8.41e-05) (8.53e-05)
black×HIw×PS 6.07e-05 8.10e-05
(1.51e-04) (1.54e-04)
black×HIw×NPC -1.09e-04 -9.94e-05
(1.31e-04) (1.33e-04)
black×HIw×PPC 1.08e-04 1.36e-04
(1.67e-04) (1.70e-04)
black×HIw×PC -1.52e-04 -1.31e-04
(1.69e-04) (1.72e-04)
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Sample: Black and White Males
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Uˆ = Uˆjt Uˆ = Uˆ
edu
jt
HI†b (NPS) 2.62e-04*** 2.77e-04***
(2.64e-05) (2.64e-05)
HIb×PS -4.24e-04*** -4.21e-04***
(3.91e-05) (3.94e-05)
HIb×NPC 7.33e-05** 6.18e-05*
(3.67e-05) (3.67e-05)
HIb×PPC -8.30e-05** -8.44e-05**
(4.01e-05) (4.03e-05)
HIb×PC -2.87e-04*** -2.80e-04***
(3.63e-05) (3.65e-05)
black×HIb (NPS) -3.10e-04*** -2.88e-04***
(6.78e-05) (6.89e-05)
black×HIb×PS 5.22e-05 3.53e-05
(1.24e-04) (1.27e-04)
black×HIb×NPC -2.78e-05 -3.60e-05
(1.06e-04) (1.07e-04)
black×HIb×PPC -1.48e-04 -1.72e-04
(1.36e-04) (1.39e-04)
black×HIb×PC 2.17e-04 2.02e-04
(1.37e-04) (1.40e-04)
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Sample: Black and White Males
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Uˆ = Uˆjt Uˆ = Uˆ
edu
jt
population‡(1990) 0.005*** 0.004***
(0.000) (0.000)
black population‡ (1990) -0.041*** -0.043***
(0.001) (0.001)
% black (1990) -2.010*** -2.303***
(0.054) (0.055)
% white out-migrant (1985-1990) -0.753*** -0.842***
(0.071) (0.072)
% white in-migrant (1985-1990) 0.345*** 0.385***
(0.023) (0.023)
% black out-migrant (1985-1990) -5.540*** -5.237***
(0.078) (0.079)
% black in-migrant (1985-1990) 0.542*** 0.437***
(0.027) (0.026)
annual unemployment rate (1995) -18.470*** -17.310***
(0.240) (0.238)
predicted ln(w) 1.342*** 1.273***
(0.024) (0.025)
distance in km -0.002*** -0.002***
(1.15e-05) (1.14e-05)
distance-squared in km2 3.91e-07*** 3.87e-07***
(2.94e-09) (2.94e-09)
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Sample: Black and White Males
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Uˆ = Uˆjt Uˆ = Uˆ
edu
jt
birth-state 1.926*** 1.911***
(0.009) (0.009)
birth-state of spouse 1.971*** 1.960***
(0.014) (0.014)
birth-state of both -1.346*** -1.339***
(0.023) (0.023)
# same occupation 2.16e-05*** 2.20e-05***
(3.70e-07) (3.74e-07)
# same industry‡ 4.54e-06*** 4.52e-06***
(3.26e-07) (3.26e-07)
black migrants‡ (1985-1990) 0.002*** 0.002***
(3.55e-05) (3.57e-05)
Observations 20,570,299 20,412,247
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
† in $100’s.
‡ in 100,000’s.
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Figure 3.1: Kernal Density of Unexplained Wage Differences (1989-1999)
103
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
% %
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2 2
%
%
%
%
% %
%
%
%
%%
%
%
%
%
%
%
% %
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
% %
%
%
%
%
%
%
%%%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
2
2
2
2
2 2
2
2
2
22
2
2
2
2
2
2
2 2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2 2
2
2
2
2
2
2
222
2
2
2
2
2
2
22
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
% %
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%% %
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
% %%
%
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
22
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2 2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
22 2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2 22
2
%
%
%%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
2
2
22
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
Unexplained Wage Gaps 1989
Legend
Unexplained Wage Gaps 1989
%2 -0.086607 - 0.000000
%2 0.000001 - 0.200000
%2 0.200001 - 0.300000
%2 0.300001 - 0.400000
%2 0.400001 - 0.500000
Figure 3.2: Unexplained Wage Gaps (1989)
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Unexplained Wage Gaps 1999
%2 -0.086607 - 0.000000
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Figure 3.3: Unexplained Wage Gaps (1999)
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Appendix A
Proofs
Proof that ηA < ηB < ηl
ηA < ηB
when
0 < (θr + θ
A
ws
A
l + θ
B
ws
B
l )[(s
A
Φ/s
A
l )− (sBΦ/sBl )].
The single-crossing assumption guarantees that the right hand side is positive. Likewise,
ηB < ηl
when
0 < (sBΦ/s
B
l )(s
B
l θ
A
w + s
A
l θ
B
w + θr),
where all terms on the ride hand side are positive. By transitivity, the proof is complete.
Proof that (wˆA/Φˆ)− (wˆB/Φˆ) Q 0 when η Q η˜.
Define η˜ as the value of η for which (wˆA/Φˆ) = (wˆB/Φˆ).
η˜ ≡ θr(s
A
Φ − sBΦ) + (1− θr)(sAΦsBl − sBΦsAl )
sBl − sAl
R η
The position of η˜ relative to the other thresholds depends on the relative budget shares of the
workers. There are 3 possible cases under single-crossing preferences and each is examined
below.
110
Case 1: sBΦ ≤ sAΦ and sBl > sAl
In this case, ηl ≤ η˜ holding with equality when sBΦ = sAΦ. This inequality holds when
sAΦθ
A
w + s
B
Φθ
B
w ≤
θr(s
A
Φ − sBΦ) + (1− θr)(sAΦsBl − sBΦsAl )
sBl − sAl
, (A.1)
which can be reduced to
sBΦ ≤ sAΦ.
The assumption sBl ≥ sAl dictates the direction of the inequality. Thus, under the as-
sumptions of Case 1, it is sufficient for ηl > 0, or the rent gradient to be positive, for
(wˆA/Φˆ)− (wˆB/Φˆ) < 0.
Case 2: sAΦ > s
B
Φ and s
A
l ≤ sBl
When sAl = s
B
l , η˜ does not exist. In this case (wˆ
A/Φˆ) < (wˆB/Φˆ) for all values of η.
This can be seen by noting the fact that when sBl = s
A
l and s
A
Φ > s
B
Φ ,
(wˆA/Φˆ)− (wˆB/Φˆ) = (θr + (1− θr)sAl )(sBΦ − sAΦ) < 0
where the inequality always holds due to the assumption that sAΦ > s
B
Φ .
When both inequalities are strict, η˜ < ηA. This inequality holds if
θr(s
A
Φ − sBΦ) + (1− θr)(sAΦsBl − sBΦsAl )
sBl − sAl
< sBΦθ
B
w − (sAΦ/sAl )(θr + θBwsBl ). (A.2)
Since sBl < s
A
l , inequality A.2 can be reduced to
sBΦ/s
B
l < s
A
Φ/s
A
l ,
which holds according to assumption 1.
Case 3: sAΦ < s
B
Φ and s
A
l < s
B
l
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In this case, ηB < η˜ < ηl. The first inequality implies
sAΦθ
B
w − (sBΦ/sBl )(θr + θAwsAl ) <
θr(s
A
Φ − sBΦ) + (1− θr)(sAΦsBl − sBΦsAl )
sBl − sAl
. (A.3)
If sAl < s
B
l , then inequality A.3 can be reduced to
sBΦ/s
B
l < s
A
Φ/s
A
l ,
which holds according to assumption 1. The second inequality holds when
θr(s
A
Φ − sBΦ) + (1− θr)(sAΦsBl − sBΦsAl )
sBl − sAl
< sAΦθ
A
w + s
B
Φθ
B
w , (A.4)
which, using sAl < s
B
l , can also be reduced to
sBΦ/s
B
l < s
A
Φ/s
A
l ,
which holds according to assumption 1.
Appendix B
Monte Carlo Experiment
To test whether the additional information used in the 1999 categories of the amenity
index has a bias that makes it more likely to find conditional quantile coefficients that
decrease with quantile, a monte carlo experiment was carried out. First, 100 draws of x were
taken where x ∼ U(0, 1). The dependent variable y was constructed such that
y = a+ bx+ e (B.1)
for half the observations and
y = a+ b(x+ u) + e, (B.2)
for the other half, where e ∼ N(0, 1) and u ∼ N(0, 1). The u was applied to half of the
observations to model roughly half of the observations in the data set used in Section 2.2
that had amenity measures from 1989, which utilized less information and are assumed to
be noisier measures of the true amenity levels compared to the measures of 1999.
Quantile regressions were then run for quantiles 10, 25, 50, 75, and 90. The process
was repeated 1,000 times for all b ∈ {−5, 0, 5}. The estimated coefficients for the higher
quantile regressions were not observed to be systematically smaller that those of the lower
quantiles. More specifically, bˆq > bˆq
′
for q < q′was found to hold approximatley 50% of the
time while bˆq < bˆq
′
approximately 50% of the time across all simulations suggesting that the
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effect was purely random in the simulation. These differences were very small and it is likely
that the hypothesis that bˆq = bˆq
′
could not be rejected in any of the trials. Thus, no evidence
was found that a more precise x variable would force estimated quantile coefficients to be
decreasing with quantile.
To more specifically test if the alteration in the amenity scores biased the censored
quantile algorithm, the experiment was repeated for the specification
y = a+ edu + bx+ e (B.3)
for half the observations and
y = a+ edu + b(x+ u) + e, (B.4)
for the other half, where edu∼ U(0, 20) is meant to simulate years of education. Five percent
of the observations in each “year” were then given an artificial top-code and the censored
algorithm was run. The results were qualitatively identical to the first experiment. Namely,
the coefficients on the amenity index were not more likely to decrease with quantile when
censoring was introduced.
Appendix C
Marginal Effects
The coefficients for all interacted variables are merely suggestive at this stage. Inter-
action coefficients from a logit estimation cannot be interpreted analogously to those from
a least squares estimation (Ai and Norton, 2003). More specifically, the marginal effect of
an interaction term is not equal to its coefficient. The interaction terms here all consist of a
continuous variable (wage gap or housing index) and a discrete variable (group indicators).
Therefore, the marginal effect for any interaction is equal to the discrete difference between
the first derivative with respect to the continuous variable when the indicator is equals unity
and when it equals zero. For example, the marginal effect of the interaction between the
unexplained wage gap and power couples is
∆(
∂F (xi,Mj ,zij)
∂Uj
)
∆PCi
= (γU + δU×PC)F (uPC)(1− F (uPC))
−γUF (uNPC)(1− F (uNPC))
where
F (u) =
eu
1 + eu
,
uPC ≡ [γU + δU×PC ]Uj + βPC +Xβ
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is the conditional mean of power couples,
uNPC ≡ γUUj +Xβ
is the conditional mean of non-power couples, and Xβ contains all terms in F (xi,Mj, zij)
other than the three under question here and their coefficients.
Although an ado file exists for STATA that will calculate marginal effects for interaction
terms in a logit estimation (Ai et al, 2004), it is unable to do so for a data set as large as
the one used here within a practical amount of time.
